§2.8τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δʼ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις·
Since there are three dispositions, two of them being vices (one of excess and one of deficiency) and one being virtue (the mean), they are all in a way opposed to one another; for the extremes are contrary both to the mean and to each other, and the mean is contrary to the extremes.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
For as the equal is greater in relation to the less, but less in relation to the greater, so the intermediate states exceed in relation to the deficiencies, but fall short in relation to the excesses, both in the passions and in the actions.
ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δʼ ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος.
For the brave person appears rash in relation to the cowardly, but cowardly in relation to the rash; similarly also the temperate person appears self-indulgent in relation to the insensible, but insensible in relation to the self-indulgent, and the liberal person appears prodigal in relation to the illiberal, but illiberal in relation to the prodigal.
διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.
Therefore the extremes also push the intermediate person away, each to the other, and the cowardly person calls the brave person rash, while the rash calls him cowardly, and analogously in the other cases.
οὕτω δʼ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.
Since these are so opposed to each other, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the mean; for these stand further apart from each other than from the mean, just as the great from the small and the small from the great, rather than both from the equal.
ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης·
Moreover, in some extremes there appears a certain likeness to the mean, as rashness to bravery and prodigality to liberality; but there is the greatest unlikeness between the extremes to each other.
τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα.
And those things that are furthest apart from each other are defined as contraries, so that those that are further apart are more contrary.
πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφʼ ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφʼ ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλʼ ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα.
But to the mean, in some cases the deficiency is more opposed, and in others the excess, as to bravery not rashness, which is the excess, but cowardice, which is the deficiency; and to temperance not insensibility, which is the lack, but self-indulgence, which is the excess.
διὰ δύο δʼ αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δʼ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
This happens due to two causes: one arising from the thing itself; for because one extreme is closer and more like the mean, we do not oppose this but rather its contrary to the mean; for example, since rashness seems more like bravery and closer to it, but cowardice more unlike, we oppose the latter rather than the former; for those things that are further from the mean seem to be more contrary to it.
μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται.
This, then, is one cause, arising from the thing itself; and the other arises from ourselves; for those things to which we ourselves are by nature more inclined appear more contrary to the mean.
οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα.
For example, we ourselves are more naturally inclined toward pleasures, and therefore we are more easily carried away toward self-indulgence than toward propriety.
ταῦτʼ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.
We therefore say that those things are more contrary to which our inclination is greater; and for this reason self-indulgence, which is the excess, is more contrary to temperance.