§2.7#2ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν·
There is also excess, deficiency, and a mean concerning anger; and though these are almost nameless, let us call the intermediate person mild and the mean mildness, since we speak of them as such.
τῶν δʼ ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δʼ ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία.
Of the extremes, let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, while the one who is deficient a certain unirascible person, and the deficiency unirascibility.
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δʼ ἀλλήλων·
There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one another, but differ from each other.
πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἣ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δʼ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.
For they are all concerned with association in words and actions, but they differ in that one is concerned with the truth in them, and the others with what is pleasant; and of this, one part is in play, the other in all the affairs of life.
ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δʼ ἄκρα οὔτʼ ἐπαινετὰ οὔτʼ ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά.
We must therefore speak about these too, in order that we may better see that in all things the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither praiseworthy nor correct, but blameworthy.
εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δʼ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου.
Most of these also are nameless, but we must try, as in the other cases, to coin names ourselves for the sake of clarity and of making it easy to follow.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων.
Concerning the truth, then, let the intermediate person be called a certain truthful person and the mean truth; pretension toward the greater is boastfulness and the one who has it a boaster, while that toward the lesser is irony and the one who has it an ironical person.
περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία·
Concerning what is pleasant, in play, the intermediate person is witty and the disposition wit, while the excess is buffoonery and the one who has it a buffoon, and the one who is deficient is a certain boor and the state boorishness.
περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δʼ ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.
Concerning the remaining pleasantness in life, the one who is pleasant as he ought to be is a friend and the mean friendliness; of those who exceed, the one who does so for no purpose is obsequious, but if for his own advantage, a flatterer; while the one who is deficient and unpleasant in everything is a certain quarrelsome and sullen person.
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες·
There are also means in the passions and concerning the passions.
ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων.
For shame is not a virtue, but the modest person is also praised.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὃ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων.
For in these too one is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, like the bashful person who is ashamed of everything; and the one who is deficient or ashamed of nothing at all is shameless, while the intermediate one is modest.
νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας·
Indignation is a mean between envy and malice, and these are concerned with the pain and pleasure felt at what happens to our neighbors.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δʼ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν.
For the indignant person is pained at those who prosper undeservedly, while the envious person, exceeding him, is pained at everything, and the malicious person falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.
But concerning these there will be a fit opportunity elsewhere too; and concerning justice, since it is not spoken of in a single sense, after this we shall divide it and speak of each of its kinds, showing how they are means; and similarly also concerning the intellectual virtues.