Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §2.7#1

Application of the Mean to Specific Virtues

Passage 19 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle applies the general theory of the mean to specific virtues, systematically categorizing the excesses, deficiencies, and means regarding courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, and ambition.

§2.7#1δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν.
But this must not only be stated in general terms, but must also be applied to the particular cases.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν.
For among the statements concerning actions, the general ones are more common, but those on particular points are more true; for actions are concerned with particulars, and we must agree with these.
ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.
We must, therefore, take these from the table.
περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δʼ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός.
Now, concerning fear and confidence, courage is the mean; of those who exceed, the one who exceeds in fearlessness is nameless (and many cases are nameless), while the one who exceeds in confidence is rash, and the one who exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is cowardly.
περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία.
Concerning pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a lesser degree concerning pains—the mean is temperance, and the excess is self-indulgence.
ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδʼ ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.
Those who are deficient concerning pleasures do not occur very much; wherefore also such people have not even received a name, but let them be called insensible.
περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία.
Concerning the giving and taking of wealth, the mean is liberality, and the excess and deficiency are prodigality and meanness.
ἐναντίως δʼ ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δʼ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει.
But people exceed and fall short in opposite ways in these; for the prodigal exceeds in giving but falls short in taking, while the mean person exceeds in taking but falls short in giving.
νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται.
For now, then, we speak in outline and summary, being content with just this; but later they will be defined more precisely.
περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δʼ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
Concerning wealth there are also other dispositions: the mean is magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man, since the former is concerned with great things, the latter with small ones), the excess is vulgarity and lack of taste, and the deficiency is pettiness; these differ from those concerned with liberality, and how they differ will be stated later.
περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δʼ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δʼ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος.
Concerning honor and dishonor, the mean is magnanimity, the excess is a certain vanity so-called, and the deficiency is pusillanimity; and just as we said liberality is related to magnificence, differing by being concerned with small things, so also is there a certain state related to magnanimity, which is concerned with great honor, while this state itself is concerned with small honor; for it is possible to desire honor as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the one who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the one who is deficient is called unambitious, while the intermediate one is nameless.
ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία.
The dispositions are also nameless, except that of the ambitious man, which is ambition.
ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δʼ ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δʼ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον.
Whence the extremes claim the middle position; and we ourselves also sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes we praise the ambitious person and sometimes the unambitious.
διὰ τίνα δʼ αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
For what reason we do this will be stated in the following; but now let us speak of the rest in the manner we have indicated.

Notes

  1. 1107a29δέον δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν — The participle `δέον` is used impersonally (either as an omission of `δέον ἐστί` or as an accusative absolute) meaning 'it being necessary to agree.' It follows the causal clause `περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις` (for actions are concerned with particulars) to express the necessity that general accounts must harmonize with concrete cases.
  2. 1107b1τῶν δʼ ὑπερβαλλόντων — A genitive phrase acting as a partitive genitive ('of those who exceed'), introducing the subjects of the subsequent clauses `ὁ μὲν...`. Because this excess refers to two different scales (fear and confidence), it is subdivided into different types of 'excessive' individuals.
  3. 1107b5ἧττον δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας — This parenthetical clause explains Aristotle's ethical definition that temperance (`σωφροσύνη`) is primarily concerned with pleasures, and only to a lesser degree with pains. Despite the cruces around `†καὶ†` indicating textual corruption or doubt, the context yields the sense 'and to a lesser extent, indeed, concerning pains.'
  4. 1107b24ὡς δʼ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα — The phrase `ἔχειν πρὸς...` denotes 'to be related to...' Here it describes how liberality is related to magnificence, with the following dative phrase of respect/cause `τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν` ('differing by being concerned with small things') explaining the exact nature of this relationship.
  5. 1107b31ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· — The verb `ἐπιδικάζονται` means 'to claim for oneself.' Because the middle position (`μέση χώρα`) has no distinct name, the extremes (`οἱ ἄκροι`) lay claim to this intermediate space as if it belonged to them or aligned with their respective characters.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §2.7#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:2.7%231

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.