§2.4ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί.
One might raise the question how we can say that it is necessary for those who do just things to become just, and those who do temperate things to become temperate; for if they do just and temperate things, they are already just and temperate, just as if they do grammatical and musical things, they are grammatical and musical.
ἢ οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει;
Or is it not so even in the case of the arts?
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου.
For it is possible to do something grammatical both by chance and under another's instruction.
τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν.
He will be grammatical, then, only if he both does something grammatical and grammatically; and this is in accordance with the grammar in himself.
ἔτι οὐδʼ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς·
Furthermore, there is no similarity between the cases of the arts and the virtues; for the things produced by the arts have their goodness in themselves.
ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι·
It is sufficient, therefore, that these should be produced in a certain state.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτʼ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος διʼ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ.
But the things that are done in accordance with the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are in a certain state, but only if the agent also acts while being in a certain state: first, if he acts knowingly; secondly, if he acts by choice, and by choice for their own sake; and thirdly, if he acts from a firm and unchangeable state.
ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.
These conditions, except for the knowing itself, are not counted toward having the other arts; but toward having the virtues, knowing has little or no power, whereas the other conditions have no small power but rather all the power—the very conditions which are acquired from doing just and temperate things many times.
τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
Thus actions are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do; but the just and temperate man is not he who merely does these, but he who also does them as just and temperate men do them.
εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός.
It is well said, then, that from doing just actions the just man is produced, and from doing temperate actions the temperate man; and from not doing them, no one would even be likely to become good.
ἀλλʼ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δʼ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων.
But the many do not do these things, but taking refuge in argument they think they are doing philosophy and will become good in this way, doing something similar to sick people who listen to their doctors attentively, but do nothing of what they are prescribed.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδʼ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
Just as, therefore, those people will not have their body in a good state by being treated in this way, so these people will not have their soul in a good state by doing philosophy in this way.
§2.5μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον.
After these things we must consider what virtue is.
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή.
Since, then, the things that occur in the soul are three—passions, capacities, states—virtue must be one of these.
λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθʼ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθʼ ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθʼ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.
By passions I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and generally those which are followed by pleasure or pain; and by capacities, those in respect of which we are said to be capable of experiencing these, for instance, those in respect of which we are capable of being angry or being pained or feeling pity; and by states, those in respect of which we stand well or badly in relation to the passions, for instance, in relation to being angry, if we do so violently or slackly, we stand badly, but if moderately, well; and similarly in relation to the other things.
πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθʼ αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθʼ αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτʼ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλʼ ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.
Now, neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad in respect of our passions, but in respect of our virtues and vices, and because in respect of our passions we are neither praised nor blamed (for the man who fears or who is angry is not praised, nor is the man who is simply angry blamed, but the man who is so in a certain way), but in respect of our virtues and vices we are praised or blamed.
ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δʼ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.
Furthermore, we are angry and we fear without choice, but the virtues are certain choices or not without choice.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως.
And besides these things, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and vices we are said not to be moved but to be in a certain disposition.
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτʼ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα·
For these reasons they are not capacities either; for we are neither called good nor bad simply because we are capable of experiencing passions, nor are we praised or blamed.
ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον.
Furthermore, we are capable by nature, but we do not become good or bad by nature; and we spoke about this earlier.
εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.
If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, it remains that they are states.
ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.
What virtue is in its genus, then, has been said.