§2.6#1δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις.
But we must not only say this, that virtue is a state, but also what kind of state it is.
ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν.
We must say, then, that every virtue, of whatever it is the virtue, both renders that thing itself in a good state and enables it to perform its function well; for instance, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye excellent and its function; for by the virtue of the eye we see well.
ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους.
Similarly, the virtue of a horse both makes the horse excellent and makes it good at running and at carrying its rider and at standing its ground against the enemy.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφʼ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφʼ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει.
If, then, this is so in all cases, the virtue of man also would be the state from which a man becomes good and from which he will perform his own function well.
πῶς δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδʼ ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς.
How this will be, we have already said, but it will become further clear in the following way, if we consider what kind of nature it has.
ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δʼ ἔλαττον τὸ δʼ ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δʼ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.
In everything continuous and divisible, it is possible to take the more, the less, and the equal, and these either in reference to the thing itself or in reference to us; and the equal is a certain mean between excess and deficiency.
λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφʼ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δʼ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν.
By the mean of the thing itself, I mean that which is equally distant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all; but in reference to us, that which neither exceeds nor falls short; and this is not one, nor is it the same for all.
οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
For instance, if ten are many and two are few, they take six as the mean in reference to the thing; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion.
τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ.
But the mean in reference to us is not to be taken in this way; for if ten minae of food are a lot for someone and two minae are a little, the trainer will not prescribe six minae; for this is perhaps also a lot or a little for the one who is to receive it: for Milo it is a little, but for the beginner in gymnastics it is a lot.
ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης.
Similarly in the case of running and wrestling.
οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθʼ αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
In this way, indeed, every scientific expert avoids excess and deficiency, but seeks the mean and chooses this, and a mean not of the thing itself but in reference to us.
εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτʼ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται)· ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική.
If, then, every science performs its function well in this way, by looking toward the mean and leading its products toward this (whence people are accustomed to say of works that are in a good state that it is possible neither to take away nor to add anything, since excess and deficiency destroy goodness, while the mean preserves it, and excellent craftsmen, as we say, work looking toward this)—and virtue, being more precise and better than any art, just as nature also is, would be aiming at the mean.
λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον.
I mean moral virtue; for this is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, deficiency, and the mean.