§10.9#1ἆρʼ οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν;
Now, if these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, have been sufficiently discussed in outline, should we think that our purpose has reached its end?
ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά·
Or, as is said, is the end in practical matters not to contemplate and know each thing, but rather to practice them?
οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλʼ ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα;
Nor is it sufficient to know about virtue, but we must try to possess and use it, or if there is any other way we become good.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι·
If, then, arguments were self-sufficient for making people decent, they would justly have brought many and great rewards, according to Theognis, and we would have had to provide them.
νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τʼ εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
But as it is, they seem to be able to encourage and stimulate those of the young who are of a generous mind, and to make a character that is well-born and truly loves the beautiful receptive to virtue, but they appear unable to encourage the many towards nobility and goodness.
οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδʼ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
For they are not by nature disposed to obey a sense of shame but fear, nor to abstain from bad things because of baseness but because of punishments.
πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ διʼ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδʼ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες.
For living by passion, they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, but they have no conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted it.
τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι;
What argument, then, could reform such people?
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι·
For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been gripped by habits.
ἀγαπητὸν δʼ ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων διʼ ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς.
But we must perhaps be content if, when all the means by which we are thought to become decent are present, we might share in virtue.
γίνεσθαι δʼ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἳ μὲν φύσει οἳ δʼ ἔθει οἳ δὲ διδαχῇ.
Now, some think we become good by nature, others by habit, and others by teaching.
τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει·
The contribution of nature, then, is clearly not in our power, but is present through some divine cause in those who are truly fortunate.
ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτʼ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα.
But argument and teaching perhaps do not have power in all cases, but the soul of the listener must have been prepared beforehand by habits to enjoy and hate in a noble way, like land that is to nourish the seed.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδʼ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δʼ οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι;
For one who lives according to passion would not listen to an argument that turns him away, nor indeed would he understand it; and how is it possible to change the mind of one who is in this state?
ὅλως τʼ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ.
In general, passion seems to yield not to argument but to force.
δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.
The character, therefore, must somehow pre-exist as akin to virtue, loving what is noble and disgusted by what is shameful.
ἐκ νέου δʼ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις.
But to obtain a right training toward virtue from youth is difficult without being brought up under such laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to the many, and especially to the young.
διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα.
Therefore, training and occupations must be ordained by laws; for they will not be painful once they have become habitual.
οὐχ ἱκανὸν δʼ ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλʼ ἐπιεδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθʼ ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ.
But it is perhaps not sufficient for them to receive right training and care when they are young, but since they must also practice these things and be habituated to them when they have grown into manhood, we would need laws concerning these too, and generally indeed for the whole of life; for the many obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than what is noble.
διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δʼ ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν·
Therefore, some think that legislators ought to encourage people to virtue and urge them to it for the sake of what is noble, on the assumption that those who have been decently brought up by habits will listen; but that they should impose punishments and penalties on those who are disobedient and of a less gifted nature, and completely banish the incurable.
τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον.
For they think that the decent person, living with a view to what is noble, will obey argument, but the base person, desiring pleasure, must be punished by pain like a beast of burden.
διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἳ μάλιστʼ ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
Therefore, they also say that the pains must be of such a kind as are most opposed to the pleasures that are loved.