§10.8#2τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία;
Indeed, when action and, still more, production are taken away from a living being, what is left except contemplation?
ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.
Therefore, the activity of God, which surpasses in blessedness, would be contemplative; and of human activities, that which is most akin to this is the happiest.
σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως.
A sign of this is also that the other animals do not participate in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δʼ ἀνθρώποις, ἐφʼ ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας.
For to the gods their whole life is blessed, and to men, as far as some likeness to such activity belongs to them; but none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation.
ἐφʼ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὴν τιμία.
As far, then, as contemplation extends, so far does happiness, and those to whom contemplation more belongs, are also happier, not accidentally but in accordance with contemplation; for this is honorable in itself.
ὥστʼ εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
So that happiness would be a kind of contemplation.
δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
But he will also need external prosperity, being human; for our nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but the body must also be healthy, and food and other care must be supplied.
οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδʼ ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτʼ ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν (τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον)· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθʼ ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος.
Surely, however, we must not think that he who is to be happy will need many and great things, even if it is not possible to be blessed without external goods; for self-sufficiency and action do not consist in excess, and it is possible to perform noble actions without ruling land and sea; for even with moderate resources one can act in accordance with virtue. (This is to be seen clearly; for private citizens seem to perform decent actions no less than rulers do, but even more.) And it is sufficient if so much is present; for the life of one who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy.
καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθʼ, ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ.
And Solon too perhaps described those who are happy well, when he said that they were moderately supplied with external equipment, but had performed the noblest deeds, as he thought, and had lived temperately; for it is possible for those who possess moderate goods to do what they ought.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον.
And Anaxagoras, too, seems to have assumed that the happy man was neither rich nor a ruler, when he said that he would not be surprised if such a person appeared strange to the many; for they judge by externals, perceiving only these.
συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.
So the opinions of the wise seem to agree with our arguments.
πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δʼ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον.
Now, though such things also carry a certain conviction, the truth in practical matters is judged from deeds and life; for in these lies the decisive authority.
σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον.
We must therefore examine what has been said before by bringing it to bear on deeds and life, and if they harmonize with deeds we must accept them, but if they clash, we must assume them to be mere words.
ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν.
But he who acts in accordance with intellect, and cultivates this, and is in the best state, seems also to be most loved by the gods.
εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δʼ ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας.
For if some care for human affairs is exercised by the gods, as is thought, it would also be reasonable that they should rejoice in what is best and most akin to them (which would be intellect), and that they should requite those who love and honor this most, as caring for what is dear to them, and acting rightly and nobly.
ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθʼ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
And that all these things belong most to the wise man is not unclear.
θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα.
He is, therefore, most loved by the gods.
τὸν αὐτὸν δʼ εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστʼ εὐδαίμων.
And it is likely that the same person is also the happiest; so that in this way too the wise man would be happiest.