§10.8#1δευτέρως δʼ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί.
Secondly, the life in accordance with the other virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this are human.
δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ·
For we perform just and brave actions, and other actions in accordance with the virtues, towards one another in contracts, needs, and actions of all kinds, observing what is fitting for each in our feelings as well.
ταῦτα δʼ εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά.
And all these appear to be human.
ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή.
And some of them seem even to result from the body, and the virtue of character is closely connected with the feelings in many ways.
συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δʼ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
Wisdom, too, is linked with the virtue of character, and this with wisdom, if indeed the principles of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the correctness of the moral virtues is in accordance with wisdom.
συνηρτημέναι δʼ αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
And these, being connected also with the feelings, would belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human; and so too is the life in accordance with these, and happiness.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη·
But the happiness in accordance with intellect is separate.
τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν.
Let so much suffice to have said about it; for to describe it in detail is greater than our present task.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπʼ ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς.
And it would seem to need external equipment only to a small extent, or to a lesser extent than the moral virtue.
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει.
For let there be a need of necessaries for both, and equally, even if the politician labors more about the body and such things; for that would make only a small difference; but with regard to their activities there will be a great difference.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;
For the liberal man will need money to perform liberal actions, and the just man too for his returns (for intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly), and the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish anything in accordance with his virtue, and the temperate man will need opportunity; for how else will he or any of the others be revealed?
ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων.
It is also disputed whether choice or actions are more authoritative in virtue, since virtue is in both; it is clear indeed that perfect virtue would be in both; but for actions many things are needed, and the greater and nobler they are, the more things.
τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δʼ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι.
But the contemplator has no need of any such things, at least for his activity, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances at least to contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives with more people, he chooses to perform actions in accordance with virtue; he will therefore need such things for living as a human being.
ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη.
That perfect happiness is a certain contemplative activity would be clear from this also.
τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς;
For we have assumed the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy; but what kinds of actions is it necessary to attribute to them?
πότερα τὰς δικαίας;
Just actions?
ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα;
Or will they appear ridiculous making contracts, restoring deposits, and all such things?
ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν;
Brave actions, then, enduring terrifying things and running risks because it is noble?
ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους;
Or liberal actions?
τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν;
But to whom will they give?
ἄτοπον δʼ εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.
It is absurd if they are to have currency or anything of the sort.
αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν;
And what would temperate actions be?
ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;
Or is praise of them vulgar, because they do not have base desires?
διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτʼ ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.
If we go through them all, everything concerning actions would appear petty and unworthy of the gods.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.
But surely all assume that they live and therefore are active; for they are surely not asleep like Endymion.