§10.7εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δʼ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου.
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this would be the virtue of the best part.
εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία.
Whether this is intellect or something else which by nature seems to rule and lead and to have understanding of noble and divine things, whether it is itself divine or the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue would be perfect happiness.
ὅτι δʼ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται.
And that this activity is contemplative has been said.
ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
And this would seem to be in agreement both with our earlier discussions and with the truth.
κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς)· ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν.
For this activity is the best (since the intellect is the best of the things in us, and the objects of intellect are the best of the things that can be known); and it is also the most continuous, for we are able to contemplate more continuously than to do anything else.
οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.
And we think that pleasure must be mixed with happiness, and the activity of wisdom is confessedly the pleasantest of the activities in accordance with virtue; at all events, philosophy is thought to offer pleasures admirable for their purity and their permanence, and it is reasonable that the pastime of those who know should be pleasanter than that of those who search.
ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθʼ ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθʼ αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δʼ ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλʼ ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.
And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most of all to the contemplative activity; for while both the wise man and the just man, and the rest, need the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently provided with things of this sort, the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and similarly the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others, but the wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate, and the more so the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but nevertheless he is the most self-sufficient.
δόξαι τʼ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη διʼ αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν.
And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, whereas from practical activities we gain more or less besides the action itself.
δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνʼ εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.
And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace.
τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοιντο)·
Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisured. Military actions are completely so (for no one chooses to make war for the sake of making war, nor does he prepare for war; for he would seem to be an utterly bloodthirsty murderer if he made enemies of his friends in order that battles and slaughters might take place).
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρʼ αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν.
And the activity of the politician is also unleisured, and, apart from the political action itself, aims securing power and honors, or at all events happiness for himself and his citizens, which is different from political activity, and which we clearly seek as being different.
εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δʼ ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ διʼ αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρʼ αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.
If, then, among actions in accordance with the virtues, political and military actions are pre-eminent in beauty and grandeur, but these are unleisured and aim at some end and are not desirable for their own sake, whereas the activity of intellect, being contemplative, seems to excel in seriousness, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its proper pleasure (which increases the activity), and if self-sufficiency, leisureliness, and unweariedness (as far as is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the blessed man, are evidently those connected with this activity, then this would be the perfect happiness of man, when it obtains a complete span of life, for nothing belonging to happiness is incomplete.
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλʼ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
But such a life would be better than what is human; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by as much as this is superior to our composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other virtue.
εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.
If, then, intellect is divine in comparison with man, the life in accordance with it is also divine in comparison with human life.
οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλʼ ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει.
But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it is small in bulk, in power and worth it far surpasses everything.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον.
And each person would seem to be this part, if indeed it is the authoritative and better part.
ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτʼ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου.
It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not his own life but the life of something else.
τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.
And what was said before will apply now; for that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each; and so, for man, the life in accordance with intellect is so, if indeed this is especially man.
οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.
This life, then, is also the happiest.