§10.6εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων.
Since we have discussed what concerns virtues, friendship, and pleasures, it remains to outline happiness, since we posit it as the end of human affairs.
ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος.
Indeed, if we recapitulate what has been said before, our account would be shorter.
εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα.
For we said that it is not a state; for otherwise it might belong even to someone who sleeps throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or to someone who suffers the greatest misfortunes.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δʼ ἐνεργειῶν αἳ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ διʼ ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἳ δὲ καθʼ αὑτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθʼ αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν διʼ ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης.
If, then, these views are not satisfying, but we must rather class happiness as a certain activity, as has been said in our earlier discussions, and if among activities some are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else while others are desirable in themselves, it is clear that happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves and not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness is in need of nothing but is self-sufficient.
καθʼ αὑτὰς δʼ εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφʼ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity itself.
τοιαῦται δʼ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν διʼ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν.
And actions in accordance with virtue seem to be of this sort; for to perform beautiful and excellent actions is among the things desirable for their own sake.
καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ διʼ ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως.
And among amusements, those that are pleasant are also of this sort; for people do not choose them for the sake of other things; indeed, they are harmed by them rather than benefited, neglecting their bodies and their possessions.
καταφεύγουσι δʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιούτων.
And many of those who are congratulated on their happiness flee to such pastimes, which is why those who are witty in such pastimes are highly regarded by tyrants; for they offer themselves as pleasant in the things that tyrants desire, and tyrants are in need of such people.
δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δʼ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδʼ ὁ νοῦς, ἀφʼ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδʼ εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρʼ αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι.
Therefore, these things indeed seem to produce happiness because those in positions of power spend their leisure in them, but such people are perhaps no indication; for virtue and intellect, from which excellent activities arise, do not consist in being in power; nor if these people, having no taste for pure and liberal pleasure, flee to bodily pleasures, should we on that account think that these are more desirable; for children also think that the things valued among themselves are the best.
εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν.
It is reasonable, then, that just as different things appear valuable to children and to men, so too to bad and to decent people.
καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δʼ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν.
Therefore, as has been said many times, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are so to the good person; and for each person the activity in accordance with his proper state is most desirable, and so for the good person it is the activity in accordance with virtue.
οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν.
Happiness, then, does not consist in amusement; for it would be absurd for amusement to be our end, and for us to trouble ourselves and suffer hardship throughout our whole life for the sake of playing.
ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
For we choose everything, so to speak, for the sake of something else, except happiness; for this is the end.
σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν.
But to exert oneself and labor for the sake of amusement seems foolish and utterly childish.
παίζειν δʼ ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατʼ Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται.
But to play so that one may be serious, as Anacharsis says, seems to be right; for amusement resembles relaxation, and since people cannot labor continuously, they need relaxation.
οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.
Relaxation, then, is certainly not the end; for it exists for the sake of the activity.
δοκεῖ δʼ ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατʼ ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ.
And the happy life seems to be in accordance with virtue; and this involves serious effort, and does not consist in amusement.
βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν·
And we say that serious things are better than laughable things and those associated with amusement, and that the activity of the better part and of the better person is always more serious.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.
And the activity of the better part is already superior and more productive of happiness.
ἀπολαύσειέ τʼ ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δʼ οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.
Anyone at all, even a slave, might enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best person; but no one attributes happiness to a slave, unless they also attribute a human life to him.
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλʼ ἐν ταῖς κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.
For happiness does not consist in such pastimes, but in activities in accordance with virtue, as has also been said before.