§10.5#2ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δʼ αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί.
Therefore, the pleasure proper to a good activity is decent, while that proper to a bad one is corrupt; for the desires for beautiful things are praiseworthy, while those for shameful things are blameworthy.
οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἳ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἳ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστʼ ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
And the pleasures in the activities are more proper to them than the desires are; for the latter are distinguished both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activities, and so indistinguishable from them that it is a matter of dispute whether the activity and the pleasure are the same.
οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδʼ αἴσθησις (ἄτοπον γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν.
Nevertheless, pleasure does not indeed seem to be thought or sensation (for that would be absurd), but because they are not separated, it appears to some to be the same.
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.
Therefore, just as the activities are different, so too are the pleasures.
διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.
And sight differs from touch in purity, and hearing and smell from taste; in a similar way, then, the pleasures also differ, and among these, those concerning thought differ, and each of these groups differs from the other.
δοκεῖ δʼ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
And there seems to be a proper pleasure for each animal, just as there is a proper function; for this is the pleasure according to its activity.
καὶ ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτʼ ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους σύρματʼ ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις.
And this would also appear to anyone who considers individual cases; for the pleasure of a horse, a dog, and a human is different, just as Heraclitus says that donkeys would choose sweepings rather than gold; for food is more pleasant to donkeys than gold.
αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι.
Therefore, while the pleasures of things that differ in species differ themselves in species, it is reasonable for those of the same species to be indistinguishable.
διαλλάττουσι δʼ οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά.
Yet they vary to no small degree, at least in the case of humans; for the same things delight some and pain others, and are painful and hateful to some but pleasant and lovable to others.
καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ.
This happens also in the case of sweet things; for the same things do not seem sweet to someone with a fever and someone in health, nor does the same thing seem hot to an invalid and to someone in good condition.
ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφʼ ἑτέρων συμβαίνει.
And this happens similarly in other cases as well.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
But in all such cases, that which appears to the good person is thought to be the reality.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἁγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.
If this is said well, as it seems to be, and virtue and the good person, insofar as he is such, are the measure of each thing, then those things would be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant in which he delights.
τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις.
And if the things offensive to him appear pleasant to someone, it is not at all surprising; for many are the corruptions and ruins of humans; but these are not pleasant, except to these people and to those in such a state.
τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις·
Therefore, as for those pleasures that are confessedly shameful, it is clear that they should not be called pleasures, except for those who are corrupted.
τῶν δʼ ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι;
But among those that seem to be decent, what sort or which of them should be said to be the pleasure of a human?
ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;
Or is it clear from the activities?
ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί.
For the pleasures follow upon these.
εἴτʼ οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοιντʼ ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.
Whether, then, there is one or more activities of the complete and blessed man, the pleasures that complete these would be said to be the pleasures of a human in the primary sense, and the remaining pleasures in a secondary and remote sense, just like the activities.