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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §10.5#1

Pleasures Differing in Kind According to Activities

Passage 115 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle argues that because activities differ in species, their proper pleasures must also differ in species, supporting this by showing that proper pleasures enhance activities while alien pleasures and proper pains hinder and destroy them.

§10.5#1ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν.
Hence they seem also to differ in species.
τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφʼ ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι (οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι.
For we think that things which are different in species are completed by different things (for this appears to be the case with both natural things and those of art, such as animals, trees, drawings, statues, houses, and vessels); and similarly that activities which differ in species are completed by things that differ in species.
διαφέρουσι δʼ αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατʼ εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
Now the activities of the intellect differ from those of the senses, and these themselves differ from one another in species; and so therefore do the pleasures that complete them.
φανείη δʼ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ.
This would also become apparent from the fact that each of the pleasures is closely bound up with the activity it completes.
συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή.
For its own proper pleasure increases the activity.
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ·
Indeed, those who act with pleasure judge each thing better and make it more precise; for example, those who delight in doing geometry become geometers and understand each thing better, and similarly the lovers of music, lovers of building, and each of the others make progress in their proper work because they delight in it.
συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει.
And pleasures increase the activities, and what increases a thing is proper to it; and for things that are different in species, their proper things are also different in species.
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτʼ ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφʼ ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι.
This would become even more apparent from the fact that pleasures from other sources are hindrances to activities.
οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει.
For lovers of the flute are unable to attend to arguments if they hear someone playing the flute, because they delight more in flute-playing than in the present activity; so the pleasure in flute-playing destroys the activity concerning arguments.
ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν.
This happens similarly in other cases also, when one is active about two things at the same time; for the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it differs much in respect of pleasure, all the more, so that one does not even active in the other.
διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστʼ αὐτὸ δρῶσιν.
Wherefore when we delight intensely in anything we do not do another thing at all, and we do other things when we are only mildly pleased with something, just as in the theatres those who eat sweets do so especially when the competitors are bad.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δʼ ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν.
Since, then, proper pleasure makes activities precise, more lasting, and better, while alien pleasures mar them, it is clear that they are far apart.
σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δʼ οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας.
For alien pleasures do almost the same as proper pains; for proper pains destroy activities, as when writing is unpleasant and painful to someone, or calculating is so; for the one does not write, and the other does not calculate, because the activity is painful.
συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθʼ αὑτὴν γινόμεναι.
Thus, opposite results occur concerning activities from proper pleasures and pains; and proper ones are those that arise upon the activity in itself.
αἱ δʼ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.
And alien pleasures, as has been said, do something very similar to pain; for they destroy, though not in the same way.
διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δʼ οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν.
Now, since activities differ in goodness and badness, and some are to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, the pleasures are in a similar state; for there is a proper pleasure for each activity.

Notes

  1. 1175a21ὅθεν δοκοῦσι — The relative adverb ὅθεν (hence) refers back to the preceding argument (1175a19-21) that pleasure and activity are closely joined and inseparable. The unexpressed subject of the verb δοκοῦσι is 'pleasures' (αἱ ἡδοναί) from the context, meaning 'hence pleasures also seem to differ in species.'
  2. 1175a26ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας — The accusative noun phrase beginning with ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ and the following infinitive τελειοῦσθαι form an accusative-and-infinitive construction governed by the verb οἰόμεθα (1175a22: 'we think') from a few lines above. The subject 'we' of the main clause continues to apply here.
  3. 1175b11οὐ πάνυ — Although οὐ πάνυ literally looks like a partial negation ('not altogether'), in Classical Attic prose (especially in Plato and Aristotle) it idiomatically functions as a strong total negation ('hardly at all', 'not at all'). Here, too, it is most naturally understood as doing another thing 'not at all'.
  4. 1175b22αἱ δʼ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι — The nominative noun phrase αἱ δʼ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ('alien pleasures') is placed before the impersonal verb εἴρηται ('it has been said') and the ὅτι clause, resulting in a prolepsis (anticipation) or anacoluthon. The noun phrase, which logically should be the subject inside the ὅτι clause, is pulled to the front, meaning 'concerning alien pleasures, it has been said that they...'.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §10.5#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:10.5%231

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