§10.4#2αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω), καθʼ ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτήν.
While every sense is active in relation to its sensible object, and that which is in a good state is completely active in relation to the finest of the objects that fall under it (for this seems especially to be what complete activity is; and let it make no difference whether we say that the sense itself is active, or that in which it resides), then in each case the best activity is that of the subject in the best state in relation to the best of the objects that fall under it.
αὕτη δʼ ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη.
And this activity would be the most complete and the most pleasant.
κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δʼ ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δʼ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή.
For there is a pleasure in relation to every sense, and similarly also to thought and contemplation, and the most complete is the most pleasant, and the most complete is that of the subject in a good state in relation to the most excellent of the objects that fall under it; and pleasure completes the activity.
οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν.
But pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the sensible object and the sense do, when they are excellent, just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of being healthy.
καθʼ ἑκάστην δʼ αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δʼ ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.
It is clear that pleasure arises in connection with each sense (for we say that sights and sounds are pleasant); and it is also clear that it does so especially when the sense is at its best and is active in relation to such an object; and when both the sensible object and the sensing subject are of this kind, there will always be pleasure as long as both the active factor and the passive factor are present.
τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.
Pleasure completes the activity not as an inherent state, but as a supervening end, like the bloom of youth on those in their prime.
ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.
So long, then, as both the intelligible or sensible object is as it should be, and also the judging or contemplating subject, there will be pleasure in the activity; for when the passive factor and the active factor are similar and in the same relation to one another, the same result naturally follows.
πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται;
How is it, then, that no one feels pleasure continuously?
ἢ κάμνει;
Is it because we tire?
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.
For all human things are incapable of continuous activity.
οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδʼ ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.
Therefore, pleasure does not arise continuously either; for it follows upon activity.
ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό·
And some things delight us when they are new, but later not in the same way, for the same reason.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δʼ οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται.
For at first the intellect is stimulated and acts intensely about them, just as those who look closely with their sight; but afterwards the activity is not of this kind but becomes relaxed; wherefore the pleasure also becomes dim.
ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστʼ ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος·
One might think that everyone desires pleasure because everyone also aims at life; and life is a sort of activity, and each person is active in relation to and with those things that he loves most—as the musician is active with his hearing in relation to melodies, and the lover of learning with his intellect in relation to contemplation, and so also each of the rest.
ἡ δʼ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται.
And pleasure completes the activities, and therefore also life, which they desire.
εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν.
It is reasonable, then, that they aim at pleasure too; for it completes life for each, which is desirable.
πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι.
Whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life, let it be dismissed for the present.
συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.
For these things appear to be yoked together and not to admit of separation; for without activity pleasure does not arise, and pleasure completes every activity.