§10.4#1τί δʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν.
What it is or what kind of thing it is would become clearer if we take it up from the beginning.
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθʼ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος·
For seeing seems to be complete at any time whatsoever; for it is not lacking in anything which, coming into being later, will complete its form.
τοιούτῳ δʼ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή.
And pleasure seems to be like this.
ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατʼ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος.
For it is a sort of whole, and at no time could one take a pleasure of which the form will be completed if it occurs over a longer time.
διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν.
Therefore, it is not a motion either.
ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται.
For every motion is in time and is directed toward some end—as is the art of building, for instance—and is complete when it has made what it aims at.
ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ.
It is complete either in the whole of the time, or in this specific time.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.
But in the parts of the time, all motions are incomplete, and different in form from the whole motion and from one another.
ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον), ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα.
For the putting together of stones is different from the fluting of the column, and these are different from the making of the temple; and while the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks nothing in relation to the proposed end), that of the foundation and of the triglyph is incomplete (for each is of a part).
τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι.
So they differ in form, and it is not possible in any random time to find a motion complete in form, but, if at all, in the whole time.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
And similarly also in the case of walking and the rest.
εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατʼ εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
For if locomotion is motion from somewhere to somewhere, and there are specific differences of this, such as flying, walking, leaping, and the like.
οὐ μόνον δʼ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δʼ αὕτη ἐκείνης.
And not only is it so in this way, but also in walking itself; for the "from where to where" is not the same in the stadium and in a part of it, and in one part and in another, nor is traversing this line and that line the same; for one does not only traverse a line, but one which is in a place, and this line is in a different place from that one.
διʼ ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δʼ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλʼ αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν.
Now, precise things about motion have been said in other works, but it seems not to be complete in any random time, but the many motions are incomplete and different in form, if indeed the "from where to where" is form-determining.
τῆς ἡδονῆς δʼ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος.
But the form of pleasure is complete in any time whatsoever.
δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τʼ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή.
Therefore it is clear that they would be different from one another, and that pleasure is one of the things that are whole and complete.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι.
And this would seem to be so also from the fact that it is not possible to move without time, but to feel pleasure is possible; for what is in the "now" is a sort of whole.
ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.
And from these things it is also clear that they do not speak correctly when they say that pleasure is a motion or a generation.
οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.
For these are not predicated of all things, but of things that are divisible and are not wholes; for neither is there a generation of seeing, nor of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any of these a motion or a generation; nor indeed of pleasure; for it is a sort of whole.