§10.3οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδʼ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
Furthermore, even if pleasure is not among qualities, it does not follow because of this that it is not among goods either; for neither are the activities of virtue qualities, nor is happiness.
λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δʼ ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
And they say that the good is determinate, but pleasure is indeterminate because it admits of the more and the less.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθʼ ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταὐτά· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
If, then, they judge this from the experience of being pleased, the same will apply to justice and the other virtues, in respect of which they clearly say that people possess their characters and act in accordance with the virtues to a greater or lesser degree; for they are more just and more courageous, and it is also possible to act justly and to be temperate to a greater or lesser degree.
εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτʼ οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἳ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἳ δὲ μικταί.
But if they judge by the pleasures themselves, perhaps they are not stating the cause, if some are unmixed and others are mixed.
καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν;
And what prevents pleasure from being like health, which, though determinate, admits of the more and the less?
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλʼ ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
For the same proportion is not in all people, nor is there always one and the same proportion in the same person, but it remains up to a certain point though relaxed, and differs in the more and the less.
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
Such, then, may also be the case with pleasure.
τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται.
Furthermore, by positing the good as complete, but motions and generations as incomplete, they attempt to show that pleasure is a motion and a generation.
οὐ καλῶς δʼ ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδʼ εἶναι κίνησιν.
But they seem not to speak correctly, and it is not even a motion.
πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δʼ ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.
For swiftness and slowness seem to be proper to every motion—if not in itself, like that of the universe, at least in relation to something else; but neither of these belongs to pleasure.
ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δʼ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
For while it is possible to become pleased quickly, just as it is to become angry, it is not possible to feel pleasure quickly, not even in relation to something else, whereas it is possible to walk, to grow, and all such things.
μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατʼ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δʼ ἥδεσθαι.
Therefore, it is possible to change into a state of pleasure quickly or slowly, but it is not possible to active in accordance with it quickly—I mean, to feel pleasure.
γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη;
And how could it be a generation?
δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά.
For it seems that any chance thing does not come from any chance thing, but that into which a thing is resolved is that from which it is generated; and that of which pleasure is the generation, of this pain is the destruction.
καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δʼ ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν.
And indeed they say that pain is a deficiency of the natural state, and pleasure is its replenishment.
ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη.
But these are bodily affections.
εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτʼ ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα·
If, then, pleasure is the replenishment of the natural state, that in which the replenishment occurs would be what is pleased; this, then, would be the body.
οὐ δοκεῖ δέ·
But this does not seem to be the case.
οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτʼ ἄν τις, καὶ †τεμνόμενοσ† λυποῖτο.
Therefore, replenishment is not pleasure, but while replenishment is taking place one would be pleased, and while being cut one would feel pain.
ἡ δόξα δʼ αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει.
This opinion seems to have arisen from the pains and pleasures connected with food; for when people have become needy and have felt pain beforehand, they are pleased by the replenishment.
τοῦτο δʼ οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες.
But this does not happen in the case of all pleasures; for the mathematical pleasures are painless, as are those of the senses through smell, and also many sounds and sights, memories, and hopes.
τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται;
Of what, then, will these be generations?
οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτʼ ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις.
For no deficiency of anything has occurred, of which there could be a replenishment.
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθʼ ἡδέα (οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδʼ αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν)·
And against those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures, one might say that these are not pleasant; for if they are pleasant to those who are in a bad condition, one must not think that they are also pleasant except to them, just as we do not think that things which are wholesome or sweet or bitter to the sick are really so, nor again that things which appear white to those suffering from ophthalmia are actually white.
ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δʼ οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι·
Or one might say this, that while pleasures are desirable, they are certainly not so from these sources, just as wealth is desirable, but not if acquired by treachery, and health is desirable, but not if obtained by eating anything whatsoever.
ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Or that pleasures differ in species; for those from noble sources are different from those from base sources, and it is not possible to enjoy the pleasure of the just man without being just, nor that of the musician without being musical, and similarly in the other cases.
ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δʼ ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα.
And the friend, being different from the flatterer, also seems to make it clear that pleasure is not the good or that pleasures differ in species; for the former is thought to associate for the sake of the good, the latter for the sake of pleasure, and the latter is censured, while the former is praised as associating for other ends.
οὐδείς τʼ ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφʼ οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι.
And no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout life, finding pleasure in the things that children find pleasure in to the greatest possible extent, nor would one choose to enjoy doing any of the most disgraceful things, even if he were never to feel pain.
περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθʼ ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν.
And we would be serious about many things even if they brought no pleasure, such as seeing, remembering, knowing, and possessing the virtues.
εἰ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτʼ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἡδονή.
And if pleasures necessarily follow these, it makes no difference; for we would choose these even if no pleasure arose from them.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθʼ αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφʼ ὧν.
It seems clear, then, that pleasure is neither the good nor is every pleasure desirable, and that there are some pleasures desirable in themselves, differing in species or in their sources.
τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.
Let this suffice, then, for what is said about pleasure and pain.