§10.1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν.
After these things, it perhaps follows next to discuss pleasure.
μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ.
For it seems to be most intimately associated with our race, which is why people educate the young, steering them by pleasure and pain; and it also seems to be of the greatest importance for the virtue of character to enjoy what one ought and to hate what one ought.
διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστʼ ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν.
For these extend through the whole of life, having weight and power toward virtue and the happy life; for they choose pleasant things and avoid painful things; and concerning such matters, it would seem least of all right to pass them over, especially since they involve much controversy.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἳ δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἳ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἳ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον.
For some say that pleasure is the good, while others, on the contrary, say it is utterly bad, some perhaps being convinced that it is so, and others thinking it is better for our life to declare pleasure to be among bad things, even if it is not so; for they think that the many lean toward it and are slaves to pleasures, wherefore it is necessary to lead them to the contrary; for they think that they would thus reach the mean.
μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται.
But perhaps this is not well said.
οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς ποτʼ ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν.
For arguments about feelings and actions are less credible than facts; so when they clash with what is perceived by sensation, they are despised and undermine the truth as well; for he who censures pleasure, if he is once seen aiming at it, seems to incline toward it on the ground that all pleasure is of this nature; for making distinctions is not the way of the many.
ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατʼ αὐτούς.
Therefore, true arguments seem to be most useful not only for knowledge, but also for life; for being in harmony with facts they are believed, and so they encourage those who understand them to live in accordance with them.
τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ δʼ εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.
Of such matters, then, enough; let us go over what has been said about pleasure.
§10.2εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετʼ εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθʼ ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δʼ εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντʼ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον ὄν (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντʼ ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
Eudoxus, then, thought that pleasure is the good because he saw all things, both rational and irrational, aiming at it; and in all things that which is desirable is good, and that which is most of all so is the best; and the fact that all things are drawn toward the same object indicates that this is for all the best thing (for each thing finds its own good, just as it finds its food), and that which is good for all, and which all aim at, is the good.
ἐπιστεύοντο δʼ οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ διʼ αὑτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὕτως ἔχειν κατʼ ἀλήθειαν.
But his arguments were believed more because of the virtue of his character than on their own account; for he seemed to be exceptionally temperate; so he was not thought to say these things as a friend of pleasure, but because this was how it was in truth.
οὐχ ἧττον δʼ ᾤετʼ εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθʼ αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν· μάλιστα δʼ εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ διʼ ἕτερον μηδʼ ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δʼ ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθʼ αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.
And he thought it was no less manifest from the contrary; for pain is in itself avoided by all, and similarly its contrary is desirable; and that is most of all desirable which we choose not because of something else nor for the sake of something else; and pleasure is admittedly of this nature; for no one asks for the sake of what he is pleased, implying that pleasure is desirable in itself.
προστιθεμένην τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ.
And when added to any of the goods, it makes it more desirable, for instance, to acting justly and being temperate, and the good is increased by itself.
ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθʼ ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον.
Now this argument seems to show it to be one of the goods, and no more so than any other; for any good is more desirable with another good than when isolated.
τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι.
Indeed, by such an argument Plato also refutes the view that pleasure is the good; for he argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without it, and if the mixed is better, pleasure is not the good; for the good does not become more desirable by having anything added to it.
δῆλον δʼ ὡς οὐδʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται.
And it is clear that nothing else can be the good which becomes more desirable when combined with any of the things that are good in themselves.
τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν;
What, then, is there of this nature, in which we also can share?
τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται.
For it is something of this sort that is being sought.
οἱ δʼ ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντʼ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν.
But those who object that that which all things aim at is not good, are talking nonsense.
ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτʼ εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δʼ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.
For what seems to all, this we say is; and he who destroys this conviction will not say anything more convincing.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι;
For if only foolish things desired them, there would be something in what they say, but if wise things also do, how could they be saying anything?
ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθʼ αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.
And perhaps even in base things there is some natural good superior to themselves, which aims at their proper good.
οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
Nor does what they say about the contrary seem to be well said.
οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
For they say that, if pain is bad, pleasure is not on that account good; since bad is opposed to bad as well, and both are opposed to that which is neither—saying this not badly indeed, but not speaking the truth in the present case.
ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν τῶν κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δʼ αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
For if both were bad, both ought to have been avoided, and if neither was bad, neither ought to have been avoided, or both in like manner; but as it is, they clearly avoid the one as bad and choose the other as good; and in this way indeed they are opposed.