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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §1.7#2

The Human Function and the Good as Soul's Activity

Passage 6 of 123 · Greek

Summary

The author introduces the concept of the human "function" (ergon) to define the human good as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. He then addresses the appropriate level of methodological precision required for this inquiry and emphasizes the vital role of first principles.

§1.7#2ἀλλʼ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δʼ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι.
But perhaps to say that happiness is the best good appears to be something agreed upon, but it is desired that what it is still be expressed more clearly.
τάχα δὴ γένοιτʼ ἂν τοῦτʼ, εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
Perhaps this might indeed come about if the function (ergon) of man were grasped.
ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally for all who have some function and activity, the good and the "well" seem to reside in their function, so it would seem to be also for man, if indeed there is some function of his.
πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δʼ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἀργὸν πέφυκεν;
Are there then certain functions and activities of a carpenter and a shoemaker, but of man is there none, but is he by nature born idle?
ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι;
Or, just as there appears to be some function of eye, hand, foot, and generally of each of the parts, so also for man, besides all these, should one posit some function?
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ποτέ;
What then indeed could this ever be?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.
For living appears to be common even to plants, but what is sought is what is peculiar.
ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν.
Therefore, we must set aside the life of nutrition and growth.
ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ.
And next would be a certain sensitive life, but this too appears to be common to horse, ox, and every animal.
λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.
There remains, then, a certain active life of that which has reason; and of this, one part is obedient to reason, while the other possesses reason and thinks.
διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
And since this life also is spoken of in two ways, we must posit the one in activity; for this seems to be spoken of in a more proper sense.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δʼ αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δʼ οὕτως, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατʼ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην.
And if the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with reason or not without reason, and we say that the function of a certain kind of person and of a serious person of that kind is the same in genus, just as of a lyre-player and of a serious lyre-player, and absolutely so in all cases, with the superiority in accordance with virtue being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and of a serious one to do it well); if this is so, the human good turns out to be an activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most complete.
ἔτι δʼ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
And further, in a complete life.
μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδʼ ὀλίγος χρόνος.
For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; and so neither does one day or a short time make a man blessed and happy.
περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθʼ ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι.
Let the good, then, have been outlined in this way; for perhaps we must first sketch it, and then later fill in the details.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.
And it would seem to be open to anyone to advance and articulate what is well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or co-worker in such things; whence also the advances in the arts have occurred; for it belongs to anyone to add what is lacking.
μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφʼ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ.
But we must also remember what has been said before, and not demand precision in all things alike, but in each according to the underlying matter and to such an extent as is proper to the inquiry.
καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐφʼ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς.
For both a carpenter and a geometrician seek a right angle differently; the former insofar as it is useful for his work, the latter as to what it is or what kind of thing, for he is a spectator of truth.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται.
In the same way, then, we must act in other things, so that the main works may not be outnumbered by the side-issues.
οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δʼ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλʼ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δʼ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή.
And we must not demand the cause in all things alike, but it is sufficient in some cases that the fact "that it is so" be well shown, as indeed in the case of principles; and the fact "that it is so" is a first thing and a principle.
τῶν ἀρχῶν δʼ αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἳ δʼ αἰσθήσει, αἳ δʼ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δʼ ἄλλως.
And of principles, some are contemplated by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others in other ways.
μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα.
And we must try to pursue each in the way they are by nature, and make a serious effort that they be well defined; for they have great weight for what follows.
δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι διʼ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.
For the principle seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things being sought become clear through it.

Notes

  1. 1098a3τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος — The genitive phrase τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος ("of that which possesses reason") functions as a possessive or specifying genitive modifying πρακτική τις (with ζωή, "life," understood). It refers to the rational part of the soul as a whole.
  2. 1098a5τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν θετέον — The feminine accusative phrase τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν refers back to the previously mentioned "life" (ζωήν). The verbal adjective θετέον ("one must posit") is used impersonally and takes this accusative as its object, establishing active exercise as the defining characteristic.
  3. 1098a7εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου — This exceptionally long protasis beginning with εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν contains various parenthetical explanations and comparisons, which are finally resumed and summarized by εἰ δʼ οὕτως ("if this is so") at 1098a12 before reaching the main conclusion.
  4. 1098a29την ὀρθήν — The feminine accusative singular adjective τὴν ὀρθήν modifies an omitted noun, either γωνίαν ("angle", making it "right angle") or γραμμήν ("line", making it "straight line"). In the context of carpentry and geometry, "right angle" is the standard interpretation.
  5. 1098b2τὸ δʼ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή — The substantivized clause τὸ ὅτι ("the fact that it is so") is contrasted with seeking the cause (αἰτία). It asserts that in certain matters, establishing the mere fact is the primary starting point (πρῶτον) and serves as the first principle (ἀρχή).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §1.7#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:1.7%232

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