§1.7#1πάλιν δʼ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτʼ ἂν εἴη.
Let us return again to the good being sought, what it might ever be.
φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως.
For it appears to be one thing in one action and art, and another in another; for it is different in medicine, in generalship, and in the rest likewise.
τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν;
What then is the good of each?
ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται;
Or is it that for the sake of which the rest are done?
τοῦτο δʼ ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δʼ οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δʼ ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες.
And this is health in medicine, but in generalship victory, in house-building a house, and in another thing another, and in every action and choice the end; for for the sake of this all do the rest.
ὥστʼ εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα.
So that if there is some end of all things that are practicable, this would be the practicable good, and if there are more than one, these would be.
μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο δʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.
Thus, by shifting, the argument has arrived at the same point; but we must try to make this still more clear.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δʼ αἱρούμεθά τινα διʼ ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δʼ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.
And since the ends appear to be more than one, and of these we choose some for the sake of something else, such as wealth, flutes, and generally instruments, it is clear that not all are complete; but the best appears to be something complete.
ὥστʼ εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων.
So that if there is only some one thing complete, this would be the thing being sought, and if there are more than one, the most complete of these.
τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ διʼ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθʼ αὑτὰ καὶ διʼ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο.
And we say that what is pursued for its own sake is more complete than what is pursued for the sake of something else, and that what is never desirable for the sake of another is more complete than those things which are desirable both for themselves and for its sake, and absolutely complete, indeed, is that which is always desirable for its own sake and never for the sake of another.
τοιοῦτον δʼ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ διʼ αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ διʼ αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθʼ ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν.
And happiness above all seems to be of this character; for we always choose this for its own sake and never for the sake of another, whereas honor, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue we choose indeed also for their own sakes (for even if nothing resulted from them, we would choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, supposing that through these we shall be happy.
τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδʼ ὅλως διʼ ἄλλο.
But happiness no one chooses for the sake of these, nor generally for the sake of anything else.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ.
And the same thing seems to follow also from self-sufficiency; for the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient.
τὸ δʼ αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
But by self-sufficient we mean not for oneself alone, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and generally for friends and fellow citizens, since man is by nature political.
τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.
But of these a certain limit must be assumed; for if one extends this to parents and descendants and the friends of friends, it will go on to infinity.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δʼ αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι·
But this must be examined at another time; and we posit as self-sufficient that which, being isolated, makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such a thing we think happiness to be.
ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί.
And moreover, we think it to be the most desirable of all things, not being counted along with others—for if it were counted along with others, it is clear that it would be more desirable with the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable.
τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.
Happiness, then, appears to be something complete and self-sufficient, being the end of things practicable.