§1.8σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές.
But we must examine it not only from the conclusion and the premises of our argument, but also from what is said about it; for with the true, all facts harmonize, but with the false, the truth soon clashes.
νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.
Now, goods having been divided into three classes, some being called external, others those of the soul and of the body, we call those of the soul goods in the most proper sense and in the highest degree, and we posit the actions and active exercises of the soul as belonging to the soul.
ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.
So that our definition would be well said according to this opinion, which is ancient and agreed upon by those who practice philosophy.
ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.
And it is correct also in that certain actions and activities are said to be the end; for thus the end turns out to be one of the goods of the soul, and not one of the external goods.
συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.
And with our definition, the idea that the happy person lives well and acts well also harmonizes; for happiness has been described as, roughly, a certain living well and acting well.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθʼ ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι.
And all the features sought in connection with happiness appear to belong to what has been said.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.
For to some it seems to be virtue, to others prudence, to others a certain wisdom, and to others these or one of these accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; and others also include external prosperity.
τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλʼ ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.
Of these views, some are held by many and from ancient times, others by a few distinguished men; and it is not reasonable to suppose that either of these groups is entirely mistaken, but rather that they are right in at least some one point, or even in most points.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατʼ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.
Now, with those who say that happiness is virtue or a certain virtue, our definition is in harmony; for the active exercise in accordance with virtue belongs to virtue itself.
διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ.
But perhaps it makes no small difference whether we place the best good in possession or in use, and in state of character or in activity.
τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δʼ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει.
For the state of character, though present, may accomplish nothing good, as in the case of one who is asleep or in some other way inactive, but the activity cannot do so; for it will of necessity act, and act well.
ὥσπερ δʼ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλʼ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.
And just as at the Olympic games it is not the most beautiful and strongest who are crowned, but those who compete (for it is some of these who conquer), so also of the noble and good things in life, those who act rightly become possessors.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθʼ αὑτὸν ἡδύς.
Moreover, their life is also in itself pleasant.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατʼ ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ.
For feeling pleasure is one of the things belonging to the soul, and to each person that is pleasant of which he is said to be a lover, as a horse is to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of spectacles; in the same way, then, just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and generally actions in accordance with virtue to the lover of virtue.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δʼ αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθʼ αὑτάς.
Now to most people, the things that are pleasant conflict with one another, because they are not pleasant by nature, but to lovers of the beautiful, things that are pleasant by nature are pleasant; and such are actions in accordance with virtue, so that they are pleasant both to these people and in themselves.
οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλʼ ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of amulet, but has its pleasure in itself.
πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτʼ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
For in addition to what has been said, a person is not even good who does not rejoice in noble actions; for no one would call someone just who does not rejoice in acting justly, nor liberal someone who does not rejoice in liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases.
εἰ δʼ οὕτω, καθʼ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.
If this is so, actions in accordance with virtue must be pleasant in themselves.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δʼ ὡς εἴπομεν.
But surely they are also good and noble, and each of these in the highest degree, if indeed the serious person judges well about them; and he judges as we said.
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα· "
κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δʼ ὑγιαίνειν· ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχʼ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν. "
ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.
Therefore, happiness is the best, most noble, and most pleasant thing, and these qualities are not separated as in the Delian inscription: 'Most noble is what is most just, and best is to be healthy; but most pleasant by nature is to obtain what one loves.' For all these belong to the best activities; and we say that happiness is these activities, or the best one of them.
φαίνεται δʼ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.
But nevertheless it appears to be in need of external goods as well, as we said; for it is impossible, or not easy, to perform noble actions without resources.
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ διʼ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως·
For many things are done, as if by means of instruments, through friends, wealth, and political power.
ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δʼ ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.
And being deprived of some of these disfigures blessedness, such as noble birth, good children, or beauty; for a person is not entirely happy if he is extremely ugly in appearance, or of low birth, or solitary and childless, and perhaps still less so if one has utterly bad children or friends, or if they were good but died.
καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
As we said, then, happiness seems to require this sort of prosperity as well; whence some identify good fortune with happiness, while others identify virtue with it.