§8.3#1κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἣν ἐκαλοῦμεν ἤδη καλοκἀγαθίαν.
Now, individually concerning each virtue, it has been spoken before; but since we have distinguished their power separately, we must also articulate concerning the virtue that results from these, which we have already called kalokagathia.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὸν ταύτης ἀληθῶς τευξόμενον τῆς προσηγορίας ἔχειν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς, φανερόν.
That, therefore, it is necessary for one who is truly to obtain this appellation to possess the individual virtues is manifest.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθενὸς οἷόν τʼ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
For in the case of none of the other things is it possible to be otherwise.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει, μέρος δʼ οὐθέν, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον τῷ ὅλῳ.
For no one is healthy in his whole body while healthy in no part, but it is necessary that all, or most and the most important parts, should be in the same condition as the whole.
ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ ἔχοντα διαφοράν.
Now, being good and being noble-and-good differ not only in their names, but they have a difference in themselves.
τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά.
For of all goods there are ends, which are desirable for their own sakes.
τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα διʼ αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν.
And of these, those are noble which, existing for their own sakes, are all praiseworthy.
ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἀφʼ ὧν αἵ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις, καὶ οἱ σώφρονες· ἐπαινετὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη.
For these are the things from which both actions are praiseworthy and they themselves are praiseworthy, such as justice itself and just actions, and temperate people; for temperance also is praiseworthy.
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς.
But health is not praiseworthy; for neither is its work; nor is being strong; for neither is strength.
ἀλλʼ ἀγαθὰ μέν, ἐπαινετὰ δʼ οὔ.
Rather, they are goods, but not praiseworthy.
ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
And likewise this is clear also in the case of the others through induction.
ἀγαθὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ᾧ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθά.
A good man, then, is one for whom the things good by nature are good.
τὰ γὰρ περιμάχητα καὶ μέγιστα εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, τιμὴ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ σώματος ἀρεταὶ καὶ εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυνάμεις, ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δʼ εἶναι βλαβερά τισι διὰ τὰς ἕξεις.
For the goods that are fought over and seem to be the greatest—honor, wealth, bodily virtues, good fortunes, and powers—are goods by nature, but it is possible for them to be harmful to some on account of their states.
οὔτε γὰρ ἄφρων οὔτʼ ἄδικος ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὢν οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε χρώμενος αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροφῇ χρώμενος οὐδʼ ὁ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις.
For neither a foolish nor an unjust nor an intemperate man would derive any benefit from using them, just as a sick man would not from using the food of a healthy man, nor a weak and maimed man from using the equipment of a healthy and sound man.
καλὸς δὲ κἀγαθὸς τῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ διʼ αὑτὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικὸς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὑτῶν ἕνεκα.
And a noble-and-good man is so by virtue of the fact that, of the goods, those that are noble belong to him for their own sakes, and because he is a practitioner of noble things and for their own sakes.
καλὰ δʼ ἐστὶν αἵ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
And noble things are the virtues and the works that proceed from virtue.
ἔστι δέ τις ἕξις πολιτική, οἵαν οἱ Λάκωνες ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι ἔχοιεν ἄν.
And there is a certain civic state, such as the Lacedaemonians have or others of such a kind might have.
αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη.
And this state is of the following character.
εἰσὶ γὰρ οἳ οἴονται τὴν ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκεν.
For there are some who think that one must possess virtue, but for the sake of the goods that are so by nature.
διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσί (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν), καλοκἀγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.
Wherefore they are indeed good men (for the goods by nature are goods to them), but they do not possess kalokagathia.
οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ διʼ αὑτά, καὶ προαιροῦνται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ, καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα τούτοις καλά.
For noble things do not belong to them for their own sakes, nor do they choose the noble and good, and not only these, but also things that are not noble by nature, but are good by nature, are noble to them.
καλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὅταν, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἱροῦνται, καλὰ ᾖ, διότι τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καλά ἐστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά.
For they are noble whenever that for the sake of which they act and choose is noble, because to the noble-and-good man the things good by nature are noble.
καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν· ἄξιος δʼ οὗτος τούτων.
For justice is noble; and this is what is according to worth; and this man is worthy of these things.
καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν· πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος εὐγένεια δύναμις.
And what is fitting is noble; and these things— wealth, noble birth, power—are fitting for this man.