§8.2#2ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ εὐτυχία;
is fortune spoken of in several senses?
τὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον.
For some things are done from impulse and by those who have pre-chosen to act, but others not, but the opposite.
καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἐν οἷς κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι, κατορθοῦντας καὶ εὐτυχῆσαι φαμέν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβουλεύοντο ἂν ἢ ἔλαττον ἔλαβον τἀγαθόν.
And in the former, even in those things where they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that they succeed and are fortunate; and again in the latter, if they would have deliberated, they would have obtained less of the good.
ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ φύσιν ἐνδέχεται (ἡ γὰρ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις οὖσα οὗ ἔδει κατώρθωσεν, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἠλίθιος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς εἶναι, τύχη δʼ αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, αὐτὴ ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἔσωσεν, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἠτύχησεν)· ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἑτέροις πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατʼ εὐφυΐαν ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας;
It is possible, then, for the former to be fortunate by nature (for the impulse, being directed toward what was necessary, succeeded, whereas the reasoning was foolish; and as for some of them here, when the reasoning does not seem to be correct, but fortune being the cause of it, being itself correct, saved them, yet sometimes because of desire they reasoned again in this way and were unfortunate); but in the other class, how will fortune be according to the goodness of natural disposition of desire and appetite?
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία καὶ τύχη διττή, κἀκεῖ ἡ αὐτή, ἢ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι.
And yet, fortune and luck here are twofold, and there they are the same, or the fortunes are several.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας τινάς, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς εὐτυχίας.
But since we see some people succeeding contrary to all sciences and correct reasonings, it is clear that the cause of fortune would be something else.
ἐκείνη δὲ πότερον εὐτυχία ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἣ ἐπεθύμησεν ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει το λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ ἂν τούτου εἴη.
But as for that other, is it fortune or is it not, which desired what was necessary and when it was necessary—human reasoning would not be the cause of this.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φυσική ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός.
For indeed this is not altogether without reason, nor is the desire merely natural, but it is corrupted by something.
εὐτυχεῖν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ, ὅτι ἡ τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ λόγον (παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου)· ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ τοῦτο.
Therefore, it seems to be fortune, because fortune is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason (for it is contrary to science and the universal); but, as it seems, it is not from fortune, but it seems so because of this.
ὥσθʼ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· οὐδʼ ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν πάντων ὧν δοκεῖ.
So that this argument does not show that one is fortunate by nature, but that not all who seem to be fortunate succeed because of fortune, but because of nature; nor does it show that fortune is the cause of nothing, but not of all things of which it seems.
τοῦτο μέντʼ ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, ἆρʼ αὐτοῦ τούτου τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ.
This, however, someone might doubt, whether fortune is the cause of this very thing, of desiring what is necessary and when it is necessary.
ἢ οὕτως γε πάντων ἔσται;
Or will it thus be the cause of all things?
καὶ γὰρ τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλεύσατο βουλευσάμενος, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐβουλεύσατο, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀρχή τις, οὐδʼ ἐνόησε νοήσας πρότερον ἢ νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον.
For even of thinking and deliberating; for surely one did not deliberate having deliberated, and then deliberate on this, but there is some starting point, nor did one think having thought before thinking, and this to infinity.
οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι ὁ νοῦς ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι βουλή.
Therefore, intellect is not the starting point of thinking, nor is deliberation the starting point of deliberating.
τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν τύχη;
What then is it except fortune?
ὥστʼ ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντα ἔσται.
So that all things will be from fortune.
ἢ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἔξω, αὕτη δὲ τοιαύτη τῷ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν;
Or is there some starting point outside of which there is no other, and this being such is able to produce such a thing because of its being of such a character?
τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον τοῦτʼ ἐστί, τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.
And what is sought is this, what is the starting point of motion in the soul.
δῆλον δὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ θεός, κἀν ἐκείνῳ.
It is clear indeed that just as in the whole universe it is god, so it is in that.
κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον· λόγου δʼ ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον·
For in a way the divine in us moves all things; but the starting point of reason is not reason, but something better.
τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴη καὶ νοῦ πλὴν θεός;
What then could be better than science and intellect except god?
ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὃ οἱ πάλαι ἔλεγον, εὐτυχεῖς καλοῦνται οἳ ἂν ὁρμήσωσι, κατορθοῦσιν ἄλογοι ὄντες, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς.
For virtue is the instrument of intellect; and because of this, as those of old used to say, they are called fortunate who, if they make an impulse, succeed though being irrational, and to deliberate is not beneficial to them.
ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλεύσεως ʽοἳ δὲ τὸν λόγον· τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔχουσἰ καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, τοῦτο δʼ οὐ δύνανται.
For they have such a starting point which is better than intellect and deliberation (whereas others have reason, and do not have this), and they have inspiration, but others cannot have this.
ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι· καὶ τούτων φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, καὶ μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλʼ οἳ μὲν διʼ ἐμπειρίαν, οἳ δὲ διὰ συνήθειάν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι· τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται.
For being irrational they succeed; and of these, the prophecy of the prudent and wise is swift, and one must only subtract that which is from reason, but some use it through experience, and others through habit in consideration; and these belong to god.
τοῦτο καὶ εὖ ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὗτος.
This sees well both the future and the present, and those from whom this reason is released have it.
διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθυόνειροι.
Wherefore the melancholic and those with true dreams.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς, τῷ ἐρρωμενέστερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον.
For the starting point seems to be stronger when reason is released; and just as the blind remember better, being released from attention to things visible, because that which remembers is more robust.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι δύο εἴδη εὐτυχίας, ἣ μὲν θεία (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν) ἣ δὲ φύσει.
It is manifest then that there are two kinds of fortune, one divine (wherefore also the fortunate person seems to succeed through god), and the other by nature.
οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διορθωτικός, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν· ἄλογοι δʼ ἀμφότεροι.
And the latter is the one who goes right according to impulse, but the other is the one who goes right contrary to impulse; but both are irrational.
καὶ ἣ μὲν συνεχὴς εὐτυχία μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συνεχής.
And the one is more continuous, but the other is not continuous.