§8.3#2ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ καλά ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο.
Therefore, for the noble-and-good man, even the useful things themselves are noble; but with the many, this is in disagreement.
οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κἀκείνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, τῷ δʼ ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθά.
For things absolutely good are not good to them also, but they are good to the good man.
τῷ δὲ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά.
And to the noble-and-good man, they are also noble.
πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις διʼ αὑτὰς ἔπραξεν.
For he has done many and noble actions for their own sakes.
ὁ δʼ οἰόμενος τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει.
But he who thinks that one must possess the virtues for the sake of external goods, does noble things only by accident.
ἔστιν οὖν καλοκἀγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος.
Kalokagathia, therefore, is complete virtue.
καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δʼ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα.
And concerning pleasure too, it has been spoken what sort of thing it is and in what way it is a good, and that things absolutely pleasant are also noble, and things absolutely good are pleasant.
οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἥδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν.
But pleasure does not occur except in action; wherefore the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not in vain that people claim this.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστί τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων.
But since there is a certain limit even for the doctor, by reference to which he judges what is healthy for the body and what is not, and by reference to which up to what quantity each thing must be done and is well-producing of health, and if it is less or more, no longer so; so also for the serious man, concerning actions and choices of things that are good by nature but not praiseworthy, there must be a certain limit both of the state and of choice and avoidance and concerning the abundance and scarcity of wealth and of fortunes.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης.
Now, in what was said before, "as the right reason" was stated; but this is just as if one, in matters concerning food, should say "as medicine and its reason".
τοῦτο δʼ ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ.
And this is true indeed, but not clear.
δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν.
For it is necessary, just as in other things, to live with reference to the ruling element, and with reference to the state in accordance with the activity of the ruling element, as a slave with reference to a master's, and each with reference to the ruling authority appropriate to each.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή· ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια· ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη)· οὕτω δʼ ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν.
And since man too is by nature constituted of a ruling and a ruled part, and each would have to live with reference to their own ruling principle (and this is twofold: for the ruling principle of medicine is of one kind, and that of health is of another, and the former is for the sake of the latter); and so it is with respect to the contemplative part.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διώρισται δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε οὐθενὸς δεῖται.
For God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is that for the sake of which wisdom commands (and "that for the sake of which" is twofold, and has been distinguished in other works), since He indeed needs nothing.
ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δʼ ἢ διʼ ἔνδειαν ἢ διʼ ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη.
Whatever choice and acquisition of the goods by nature, therefore, whether of body or of wealth or of friends or of other goods, will most produce the contemplation of God, this is the best, and this limit is the most beautiful; and whatever, either through deficiency or through excess, hinders from serving and contemplating God, this is bad.
ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ τοιοῦτον.
And this holds for the soul, and this is the best limit for the soul, namely, to perceive as little as possible the irrational part of the soul, as such.
τις μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον.
Let it have been spoken, then, what is the limit of kalokagathia, and what is the aim of things absolutely good.