§8.2#1ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ φαμὲν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὖ πράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, σκεπτέον ἆρʼ ἐστι φύσει ὃ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὃ δʼ ἀτυχής, ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων.
Since not only prudence and virtue produce well-doing, but we also say that the fortunate fare well, as if fortune also produces well-doing, and the same things as knowledge, we must consider whether one person is fortunate by nature and another unfortunate, or not, and how it is with regard to these things.
ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες εὐτυχεῖς ὁρῶμεν.
For that there are some who are fortunate, we see.
ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι πολλά, ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστί, πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ.
For being foolish they succeed in many things in which fortune is authoritative; and further, even in those things where there is art, yet much of fortune is present in them, as in generalship and navigation.
πότερον οὖν ἀπό τινος ἕξεως οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οὐ τῷ αὐτοὶ ποιοί τινες εἶναι πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων;
Are they then so from some state, or is it not by their being themselves of a certain quality that they are doers of fortunate things?
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἡ δὲ φύσις ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν, ὥσπερ οἳ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἳ δὲ μελανόμματοι τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιονδὶ ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς.
For now people think so, as if some are of a certain quality by nature; and nature makes people of certain qualities, and they differ straight from birth, just as some are blue-eyed and others black-eyed because they must have such a character according to their being of such a kind, so also are the fortunate and unfortunate.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον.
For that they do not succeed by prudence is clear.
οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἳ δʼ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι (τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν)·
For prudence is not without reason, but has a reason why it acts thus; but they would not be able to say why they succeed (for then it would be an art).
ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι ὄντες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· οἷον Ἱπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκει βλὰξ καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυσίον πλέων ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολόγων διʼ εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν) ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυχοῦσιν ἄφρονες.
And further, it is manifest that they are foolish, not merely about other things (for this indeed is nothing absurd; as for instance Hippocrates, though a geometer, was thought in other things to be dull and foolish, and they say that when sailing he lost much gold to the customs collectors in Byzantium through his simplicity), but that they are foolish even in those very things in which they are fortunate.
περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι εὐτυχεῖς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὃ μὲν οὐδέν, ἄλλος δὲ βάλλει πολὺ καθʼ ἣν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής, ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν.
For in navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate, but just as in the throw of dice, one throws nothing, but another throws many, according to what he is by nature fortunate, or by being loved, as they say, by a god, and that the success is something external.
οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον ἄμεινον πολλάκις πλεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐ διʼ αὑτό, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν, οὗτος εὐτυχὴς τὸν δαίμονʼ ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν.
As, for example, a badly built ship often sails better, not through itself, but because it has a good pilot, so the fortunate person has his daemon as a good pilot.
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον.
But it is absurd that a god or daemon should love such a person, and not the best and most prudent.
εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ φύσει ἢ νόῳ ἢ ἐπιτροπίᾳ τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἐστί, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς.
If, then, it is necessary to succeed either by nature or by intellect or by some guardianship, and the latter two are not the case, the fortunate would be so by nature.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε φύσις αἰτία ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη τοὐναντίον.
And yet, nature at least is the cause either of what is always in the same way or of what is for the most part, whereas fortune is the opposite.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής, οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
If, then, succeeding contrary to reason seems to belong to fortune, but if one is fortunate because of fortune, the cause would not be such as to be always of the same thing or for the most part.
ἔτι εἰ, ὅτι τοιοσδί, ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει, ὥσπερ, ὅτι γλαυκός, οὐκ ὀξὺ ὁρᾷ, οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχὴς ἀλλʼ οἷον εὐφυής.
Further, if, because one is of such a character, one succeeds or fails, just as, because one is blue-eyed, one does not see sharply, it is not fortune that is the cause but nature; therefore he is not fortunate but, as it were, of good natural disposition.
ὥστε τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὓς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν.
So that this would have to be said, that those whom we call fortunate are not so through fortune.
οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶν εὐτυχεῖς· τύχης γάρ, ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν.
Therefore they are not fortunate; for those things are of fortune of which good fortune is the cause of good things.
εἰ δʼ οὕτως, πότερον οὐκ ἔσται τύχη ὅλως, ἢ ἔσται μέν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αἰτία;
But if so, will there be no fortune at all, or will there be, but not as a cause?
ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι.
But it is necessary both that it exists and that it is a cause.
ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν τισιν αἰτία ἢ κακῶν.
It will therefore be a cause of good things for some, or of bad things.
εἰ δʼ ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὔσης αἰτίας διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τύχην εἶναί φαμεν αἰτίαν (διὸ καὶ ὁριζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς φύσεως)·
But if it is to be entirely excluded and we must say that nothing comes from fortune, but we, because there is another cause which we do not see, say that fortune is the cause (wherefore also in defining fortune they pose it as a cause irrational to human reasoning, as if it were a certain nature); this indeed would be another problem.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρόβλημʼ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρῶμέν τινας ἅπαξ εὐτυχήσαντας, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἄν;
But since we see some who have been fortunate once, why should they not be so again?
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἕν, καὶ πάλιν.
Rather, it is because of having succeeded in one thing that they succeed again.
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ αἴτιον.
For this same thing is the cause.
οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχης τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβαίνῃ, ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δʼ οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ διʼ ἀπειρίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἄν τινες εὐτυχεῖν, ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν.
Therefore this will not belong to fortune. But when the same thing turns out from infinite and indefinite things, there will indeed be the good or the bad, but there will be no science of it because of its indefiniteness, since otherwise some would have learned to be fortunate, or indeed all sciences, as Socrates said, would be good fortunes.
τί οὖν κωλύει συμβῆναί τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις, οὐχ ὅτι οὕτως δεῖ, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἂν εἴη τὸ κύβους ἀεὶ μακαρίαν βάλλειν;
What then prevents such things from happening to someone successively many times, not because it must be so, but as it would be to throw the winning side of the dice always?
τί δὲ δή;
What then?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὁρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου, καὶ πρότεραι αὗται;
Are there not impulses in the soul, some from reasoning, others from irrational desire, and are the latter prior?
εἰ γάρ ἐστι φύσει ἡ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος ὄρεξις, φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζοι ἂν πᾶν.
For if the desire for the pleasant through appetite is by nature, that which is by nature would surely proceed towards all that is good.
εἰ δή τινές εἰσιν εὐφυεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἄδικοι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν, οὕτως εὖ πεφύκασι καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμῶσιν, ἡ φύσις πέφυκε, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθώσουσι, κἂν τύχωσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλογοι, ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἔσονται οὐ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες.
If, then, some are of good natural disposition, just as those who are untuned do not know how to sing, yet they are so well-constituted by nature and have impulses without reason where nature has designed, and desire both this and then and in such a manner as is necessary, and what is necessary and when, these will succeed, even if they happen to be foolish and irrational, just as they will also be good at singing without being able to teach.
οἱ δέ γε τοιοῦτοι εὐτυχεῖς, ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
And such indeed are the fortunate, as many as succeed without reason for the most part.
φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἄν.
Therefore the fortunate would be so by nature.