§8.1ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ χρήσασθαι καὶ ἐφʼ ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν διαστρέψαντα, ὥστε δύο τὸ ἓν φανῆναι.
One might raise a difficulty whether it is possible to use each thing both for what it is by nature suited for and otherwise, and this either in itself or accidentally; as if, for example, the eye were used for seeing, or also otherwise for seeing amiss by squinting, so that one thing appears as two.
αὗται μὲν δὴ ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμός· ὅτι ἦν δʼ ὀφθαλμῷ, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν.
Both of these are indeed uses of the eye as an eye; but the one belongs to the essence of the eye, whereas the other is accidental, as if one were to sell it or eat it.
ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, οἷον ὅταν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ μεταστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα· καὶ τῷ ποδί ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς ποδὶ χρῶνται αἱ ὀρχηστρίδες.
In like manner also with knowledge; for indeed one can use it truly and also err, as when one voluntarily writes incorrectly, so as to use knowledge now as ignorance, just as if one had turned one's hand backward; and dancers sometimes use the foot as a hand and the hand as a foot.
εἰ δὴ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, εἴη ἂν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς ἀδικίᾳ χρῆσθαι, ἀδικήσει ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἄδικα πράττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ ἀρεταί.
If, then, all virtues are kinds of knowledge, it would be possible to use even justice as injustice, and so one will act unjustly from justice by doing unjust deeds, just as one does ignorant deeds from knowledge; but if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot be kinds of knowledge.
οὐδʼ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλʼ ἁμαρτάνειν μόνον, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὔ τι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης γε ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει· ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κἀκείνῃ· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ταὐτὰ ἅπερ ὁ ἄφρων.
And not even if it is impossible to be ignorant from knowledge, but only to err and to do the same things as one does from ignorance, he will certainly not act from justice as if from injustice; but since prudence is knowledge and something true, it will do the same to that too; for it would be possible to act foolishly from prudence, and to err in the same way as the foolish person.
εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἦν ἑκάστου χρεία ᾗ ἕκαστον, κἂν φρονίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες.
But if the use of each thing were simple in respect of each thing as such, they would be acting prudently even in so acting.
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφήν· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς πασῶν κυρίας τίς;
Now in the case of other sciences, another authoritative science causes the turning; but what is the one that causes the turning of the authority over all sciences itself?
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε.
For it is certainly no longer a science.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἀρετή. χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται.
But indeed, neither is it a virtue, for the ruler uses it; for the virtue of the ruler uses the virtue of the ruled.
τίς οὖν ἐστίν;
What then is it?
ἢ ὥσπερ λέγεται ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἔχων νοῦν;
Or is it as incontinence is said to be the vice of the irrational part of the soul, and as the incontinent person is like the intemperate while having intellect?
ἀλλʼ εἰ δή, ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ᾖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει καὶ λογιεῖται τἀναντία ἡ σφι, δῆλον ὅτι, κἂν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄγνοια ᾖ, ἕτεραι μεταποιοῦνται.
But if so, when desire is strong, it will turn the intellect and reason the opposite of itself, it is clear that, even if there is virtue in the former part and ignorance in the reason, they are interchanged.
ὥστε ἔσται δικαιοσύνῃ τὸ δικαίως χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τἀναντία.
So it will be possible to use justice both justly and badly, and prudence foolishly, and so also the opposites.
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἀγνοεῖν, ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀγνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ στρέψει ταύτην, καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμως κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα, καὶ πάλιν ἡ φρόνησις ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀκολασίαν σωφρόνως πράττειν· ὅπερ δοκεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια.
For it is absurd if, on the one hand, vice arising at some time in the irrational part will turn the virtue in the rational part and make it ignorant, but on the other hand, virtue in the irrational part, when ignorance is present, will not turn this ignorance and make one judge prudently and do what is necessary; and again, if prudence in the rational part does not make intemperance in the irrational part act temperately, which is what continence seems to be.
ὥστʼ ἔσται καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας φρονίμως.
So that one will act prudently even from ignorance.
ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμως, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς ὁρῶμεν, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν οὐ στρέφει ἀκολασία.
But these things are absurd, especially using something prudently from ignorance; for we see this in none of the other sciences, just as intemperance does not turn medicine or grammar.
ἀλλʼ οὖν ὁ τὴν ἄγνοιαν, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐναντία, διὸ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν οὕτως ἔχουσαν.
But at any rate, regarding ignorance, if it is contrary, because the superiority is not in it but in virtue, on the whole it is rather virtue that is so disposed towards vice.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος πάντα ἃ ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἡ ἀδυναμία.
For indeed, the unjust person can do all that the just person can, and in general, lack of power is inherent in power.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκεῖναι αἱ ἄλλου ἕξεις, καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως.
So it is clear that those other states of the soul are at the same time prudent and good, and the Socratic saying is correct, that nothing is stronger than prudence.
ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλο γνώςεως.
But that he called it knowledge is not correct; for it is virtue and not knowledge, but another genus of cognition.