§7.12#2ἀλλʼ οὐθέν τε ἧττον βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος.
But nevertheless, the friend wishes to be, as it were, divisible just like oneself.
τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ αὑτόν πως γνωρίζειν.
Therefore, perceiving one's friend must in a way be perceiving oneself, and knowing one's friend is in a way knowing oneself.
ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ἅμα αἴσθησις ἀεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς.
So it is reasonable that even sharing in vulgar pleasures and living together with a friend is pleasant (for there always occurs a simultaneous perception of him), but even more so sharing in more divine pleasures.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἀεὶ ἥδιον ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ.
The cause is that it is always more pleasant to contemplate oneself in the better good.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάθος, ὁτὲ δὲ πρᾶξις, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι.
And this is sometimes a passion, sometimes an action, and sometimes something else.
εἰ δʼ αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἡ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε.
And if one lives well oneself, and in the same way the friend too, and they cooperate in living together, the partnership in the activities that are ends is most of all what it should be.
διὸ δεῖ συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα·
Therefore one must contemplate together and feast together, not for the sake of nourishment and necessary things; for such associations seem to be mere enjoyments.
αἱ τοιαῦται ὁμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις. ἀλλʼ ἕκαστος οὗ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἱροῦνται μάλιστα.
Rather, in whatever end each is able to attain, in this they wish to live together; but if not, they choose most of all both to do good to and to receive good from their friends.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν·
That it is therefore necessary to live together, and that all wish for this most of all, and that the happiest and best person is most of all of this kind, is clear.
ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτʼ εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἀληθῆ.
But that it did not appear so according to the argument, this also happened reasonably for one who speaks the truth.
κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἡ λύσις οὐκ ἔστιν.
For according to the composition of the comparison, which is true, there is no solution.
ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν.
For because God is not of such a kind as to need a friend, we demand the same of his likeness.
καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρʼ αὐτὸς αὑτόν.
And yet, according to this argument, the excellent person will not even think; for God's state is not such, but better than to think of anything other than Himself.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθʼ ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.
The cause is that for us, well-being is in relation to another, but for Him, He Himself is His own well-being.
καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς.
And both our seeking and wishing for many friends, and at the same time saying that no one who has many friends is a friend, are spoken correctly.
ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἱρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστʼ οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.
For if it were possible to live together and perceive together with many, it would be most desirable to do so with as many as possible; but since it is extremely difficult, the activity of perceiving together must necessarily be among fewer people, so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for experience is needed), but also to interact with them when they are acquired.
καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν.
And sometimes we wish the beloved friend to be away when he is doing well, and sometimes to share in the same things, and wishing to be together is friendly.
ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἱροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ εἵλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετʼ αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν.
For if both being together and doing well are possible, everyone chooses this; but if it is not possible, just as in the case of Heracles, his mother would perhaps have chosen that he be a god rather than be with her and serve Eurystheus.
ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεί τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους.
For the Spartan whom someone mocked when he told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm would have said similarly.
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως.
It seems to be the part of the lover to bar the beloved from sharing in difficulties, and the part of the beloved to wish to share in them, and both of these happen reasonably.
δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς μὴ ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὑτοῦ.
For nothing should be so painful to a friend as not seeing his friend; but it seems that one ought to choose not what is for oneself.
διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὑτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου.
Therefore they prevent them from sharing; for they themselves are enough when suffering, so that they may not appear to look to their own interest and to choose to rejoice while their friend is grieved.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.
Furthermore, because they are lighter when not bearing evils alone.
ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱρετὸν τό τʼ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετʼ ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος.
But since both doing well and being together are desirable, it is clear that being together with a lesser good is in a way more desirable than being apart with a greater good.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἤδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν ἥδιον ταὐτὰ ἔχοντας· οἳ δʼ ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται.
But since how much power being together has is unclear, they already differ and think that sharing all things together is friendly, just as they say that dining together is more pleasant when having the same things; but others, however, do not wish it.
ἐπεὶ δʼ εἴ γέ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσει, ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ εὖ σφόδρα χωρίς.
But since, if one makes extreme suppositions, they agree to suffer badly together, or to do very well apart.
παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας.
And similar to this is the case concerning misfortunes.
ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μηθὲν μέλλωσι ποιήσειν πλέον· ὁτὲ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἥδιστον παρεῖναι.
For sometimes we wish our friends to be away and not to be grieved when they are going to do nothing more; but at other times it is most pleasant for them to be present.
τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλʼ εὔλογον.
And this contradiction is indeed very reasonable.
διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἕξει τὸν φίλον θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δʼ ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός·
For this happens because of the things mentioned before, and on the one hand we absolutely avoid contemplating our friend being grieved or in a bad state, just as we avoid it in our own case; on the other hand, seeing our friend is pleasant, like another of the most pleasant things, because of the mentioned cause, and if he is not suffering, just like oneself.
ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ᾖ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μή.
So whichever of these is more pleasant makes the inclination to wish them to be present or not.
καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδʼ εἶναι ἀνάγκαι αὐτοῖς κακῶς.
And this also happens in the case of worse people and occurs because of the same cause; for they are especially anxious that their friends should not do well, nor that it should be necessary for them to be in a bad state.
διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποτιννύασι.
Therefore they sometimes pay off debts together with their beloved.
μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.
For they perceive the misfortune of their own people more than if they remembered that they once did better, or if they thought they were always doing badly.