§7.7ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
Thus, in how many ways loving is spoken of, and that all friendships are referred back to the primary one, is clear from what has been said.
οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας.
And it is appropriate for our inquiry to examine also concord and goodwill.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων.
For to some they seem to be the same, and to others not without one another.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ εὔνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν.
But goodwill is neither altogether different from friendship nor the same.
διῃρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτʼ ἐν τῇ καθʼ ἡδονὴν ἐστίν.
For since friendship is divided into three ways, goodwill is neither in the useful nor in the pleasant friendship.
εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τἀγαθά, οὐ διʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ διʼ αὑτὸν βούλοιτʼ ἄν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ εὔνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὔνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ·
For if one wishes good things to someone because he is useful, he would wish them not for the other's sake but for his own, whereas goodwill seems to be goodwill not for the sake of the well-wisher himself, but for the one toward whom there is goodwill.
εἰ δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν.
And if it were in the friendship of the pleasant, they would even have goodwill toward inanimate things.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὔνοια ἐστίν.
So it is clear that goodwill is concerned with character-based friendship.
ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται.
But whereas the well-wisher only wishes, the friend also acts on what he wishes.
ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δʼ εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος.
For goodwill is the beginning of friendship; for every friend has goodwill, but not everyone who has goodwill is a friend.
ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλία.
For he who only has goodwill resembles one who is beginning, and therefore it is the beginning of friendship, but not friendship itself.
δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἵ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι.
For friends seem to be in concord, and those who are in concord seem to be friends.
ἔστι δʼ οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.
But friendly concord is not about all things, but about things doable for those in concord, and all that contributes to living together. Nor is it only in thought or only in desire (for it is possible to desire the opposite of what moves one, as this is in discord in the incontinent person); indeed, there must be agreement in both choice and desire.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἵ γε φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους.
But concord is among the good; for the base, when they choose and desire these same things, harm one another.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμονοία οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ φιλία· ἀλλʼ ἣ μὲν πρώτη καὶ φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθʼ ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν.
And concord also, like friendship, seems not to be spoken of in a single way; but one is primary and by nature excellent, which is why the base cannot be in concord, while the other is that according to which even the base are in concord, when they have the same choice and desire for the same things.
οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται.
But they must desire the same things in such a way that it is possible for both to obtain what they desire.
ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται, ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δʼ οὐ μαχοῦνται.
For if they desire something that is not possible for both, they will fight; but those in concord do not fight.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ τοῦ ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν.
And there is concord when there is the same choice regarding ruling and being ruled, not that each should rule, but that the same person should.
καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.
And this concord is political friendship.