§7.6#2διʼ ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν.
to rejoice for his sake because he rejoices, is friendly.
ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ μίαν ψυχὴν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα.
Further, such sayings are also of friendship, like "friendship is equality," and that true friends "have one soul." All these are referred back to the single individual.
καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
For a person wishes good things to himself in this way.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διά τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος.
For no one does good to himself for the sake of something else, nor for the sake of gratitude.
οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ᾗ εἷς· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλεῖν.
Nor does he say that he has done so, insofar as he is one; for he who makes it clear that he loves seems to wish to be loved, rather than to love.
καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν. — οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. —πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτόν.
And wishing existence most of all, living together, sharing joy and sharing grief, being indeed one soul, and being unable to live without one another, but dying together—for so is the single individual disposed, and perhaps he associates with himself—all these belong to the good man in relation to himself.
ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ.
For in the bad man there is discord, as in the incontinent man.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι· ᾗ δʼ εἷς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.
And for this reason it seems possible for a person even to be an enemy to himself; but insofar as he is one and indivisible, he is desirable to himself.
τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος.
Such is the good man and the friend according to virtue, since the base man is not one but many, and on the same day different and capricious.
ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
Therefore, his friendship toward himself is also referred back to that of the good man.
ὅτι γάρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός, ταύτῃ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλʼ ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν.
For because he is in a way like-minded, one, and good to himself, in this way he is a friend and desirable to himself; and he is such by nature, whereas the bad man is so contrary to nature.
ὁ δʼ ἀγαθὸς οὔθʼ ἅμα λοιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης.
And the good man neither reproaches himself at the same time, like the incontinent man, nor does his later self reproach his former self, like the regretful man, nor does his former self reproach his later self, like the liar.
ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος.
And on the whole, if we must distinguish as the sophists do, as "Coriscus" and "good Coriscus" are distinguished.
δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὑτοῖς, ἀποκτιννύασιν αὑτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός.
For it is clear how much of the same is good in them, since when they accuse themselves, they destroy themselves; but everyone seems to be good to himself.
ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἁπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δύʼ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον.
But he who is absolutely good seeks to be a friend also to himself, as has been said, because he has two things in himself which by nature wish to be friends and which it is impossible to tear apart.
διὸ ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὔ, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος.
Therefore, in the case of man, each seems to be a friend to himself, but not in the case of the other animals, as a horse is not a friend to itself, and therefore not a friend.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἤδη ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν· ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.
Nor indeed are children, but only when they already have choice; for already at that time the intellect is at discord with desire.
ἔοικε δʼ ἡ φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὃ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.
And friendship toward oneself resembles that based on kinship; for neither is in their own power to dissolve, but even if they differ, yet the former are still kinsmen, and the latter is still one, as long as he lives.