§7.6#1πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθʼ ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται·
Thus, how many species of friendship there are, and what the differences are in respect of which both friends, those who love, and those who are loved are so called, and in such a way as to be friends even without this, has been said.
περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν.
But whether a person can be a friend to himself or not, involves much inquiry.
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν·
For to some it seems that each person is most of all a friend to himself, and using this as a standard they judge friendship toward other friends.
κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθʼ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δʼ ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα.
But according to the arguments and the attributes thought to belong to friends, some are contradictory, while others appear to be similar.
ἔστι γάρ πως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ.
For this friendship exists in a way by analogy, but not absolutely.
ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διῃρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν·
For being loved and loving require two distinct entities.
διʼ ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν.
For which reasons a person is rather a friend to himself in the way that has been said in the case of the incontinent and continent person, how they act voluntarily or involuntarily, by the parts of the soul having a certain relation to one another; and all such cases are similar, whether a person is a friend and enemy to himself, and whether someone does injustice to himself.
πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις· ᾗ δὴ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ᾗ δʼ οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
For all these things require two distinct entities; insofar as the soul is in a way two, these things belong to it in a way, but insofar as it is not divided, they do not belong.
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕξεως οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν διωρισμένοι, καθʼ οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν.
And from the relation to oneself, the other modes of loving are defined, according to which we are accustomed to investigate in our discussions.
δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἴεται ἀγαθά, μὴ διʼ αὑτὸν, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα·
For a friend seems to be one who wishes for someone good things, or what he thinks to be good things, not for his own sake but for the sake of that other.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται διʼ ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ διʼ αὑτὸν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν·
And in another way, one who wishes existence to someone for that other's sake and not for his own, even if he does not distribute good things; by this, namely wishing him to exist, he would seem most of all to love.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται διʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δʼ ἑτέροις.
And in another way, one who chooses to live together with someone for the sake of the company itself and not for anything else; as fathers wish existence to their children, but live together with others.
μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα.
Indeed, all these conflict with one another.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἳ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἳ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι.
For some, unless what is good for themselves is wished, others unless their existence is wished, others unless they live together, do not think they are loved.
ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν—οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ διʼ αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες.
Further, we shall set down sharing the pain of one who grieves, for no other reason, as loving—not as slaves feel toward their masters, because they are troublesome when grieving, but not for their sake, but as mothers do toward their children and birds that share in hatching.
βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστά γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα.
For a friend wishes, above all, not only to share in the grief of his friend, but even to feel the same grief, such as sharing the thirst of one who is thirsty, if that were possible, because they are closest.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν μὴ διʼ ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ
And the same argument holds also for rejoicing; for to rejoice not for any other reason, but