§7.2#4οὐ γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις.
For the goods of friends do not become common in this way; for the friend is assigned to the things, not the things to the friends.
οὐ γίνεται ἄρʼ ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πεῖραν λαβεῖν· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἂν ἔδει συζῆσαι.
Therefore, the primary friendship does not exist among many, because it is difficult to make trial of many; for it would be necessary to live together with each one.
οὐδὲ δὴ αἱρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρῆτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθʼ αἱρετέον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνῶτα εἰ βελτίων·
Nor indeed should one choose in the same way concerning a cloak and a friend; and yet in all things it seems to belong to the person of understanding to choose the better of two things, and if indeed he had used the worse for a long time, and the better not yet, this one is to be chosen, but not the stranger instead of the long-standing friend if he is better.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνευ πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ.
For the friend is not without trial nor even of one day, but there is need of time.
διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος.
Therefore, the medimnus of salt has passed into a proverb; and at the same time, he must not only be absolutely good, but also for you, if indeed the friend is to be a friend to you.
ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐστι τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἁπλῶς δʼ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτʼ ἄμφω, ὥστε ὅ ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλῳ, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλῳ δʼ ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος.
For on the one hand he is absolutely good by being good, but a friend by being good to another, and he is absolutely good and a friend when both of these agree, so that what is absolutely good is the good of this one for another (even if he is not absolutely excellent, but is good to another because he is useful).
τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.
But being a friend to many at the same time also prevents loving; for it is not possible to act at the same time towards many.
ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων.
Indeed, from these things it is clear that it is rightly said that friendship belongs to the stable, just as happiness belongs to the self-sufficient.
καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
"
ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα. "
πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν.
And it is rightly said, "For nature is stable, not riches." But it is much better to say that virtue belongs to nature, and that time is said to show the beloved, and misfortunes rather than good fortunes.
τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ἃ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἱροῦνται μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δʼ ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας.
For then it is clear that the goods of friends are common (for these alone, instead of the naturally good and naturally bad things, about which good fortunes and misfortunes are, choose the human being rather than that some of these things should exist and others should not); and misfortune shows those who are not truly friends, but who happened to be so because of utility.
ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον.
But time shows both; for even the useful is not quickly clear, but the pleasant is more so.
πλὴν οὐδʼ ὁ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ.
Except that not even the absolutely pleasant is quick.
ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως.
For human beings are like wines and foods; for of those, the pleasant is quickly clear, but when it has been there for more time it becomes unpleasant and not sweet, and likewise with human beings.
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὁριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ.
For even the absolutely pleasant must be defined by the end and by time.
ὁμολογήσαιεν δʼ ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.
And even the many would agree, that not only from the outcomes, but just as with a drink they call it sweeter; for this is not pleasant because of the outcome, but because of its lack of continuity, but at first it deceives.
ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ διʼ ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐστί, καὶ διʼ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις.
Therefore, the primary friendship, and that because of which the others are spoken of, is that in accordance with virtue, and because of the pleasure of virtue, as was said before; but the other friendships arise also among children and beasts and the bad.
ὅθεν λέγεται,
"ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει"
καὶ
"
κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ. "
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ᾗ φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλʼ οἷον ᾠδικοὶ ἄμφω, ἢ ὃ μὲν φιλῳδὸς ὁ δʼ ᾠδικὸς ἐστίν, καὶ ᾗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ ᾗ οὐδέτεροι.
Hence it is said, "An equal delights an equal," and "The bad man is fused to the bad man in pleasure." For the bad can also be pleasant to each other, not in so far as they are bad or neither, but like being both musical, or the one being music-loving and the other musical, and in so far as all have some good, and in this way they fit each other; further they might be useful and beneficial to each other, not absolutely but in relation to their choice, or in so far as they are neither.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φαύλῳ εἶναι φίλον.
And it is also possible for the decent person to be a friend to a bad person.
καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὃ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθά, ἁπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δʼ ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ᾗ πενία συμφέρει ἢ νόσος, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦδʼ ἕνεκα βούλεται.
For he would also be useful in relation to choice: the bad person in relation to that which belongs to the excellent person, and the latter to the self-indulgent person in relation to that which belongs to him, and to the bad person in relation to that which is according to nature; and he will wish him good things, absolutely indeed the absolute goods, and those for him on hypothesis, in so far as poverty or illness is beneficial, and these for the sake of the absolute goods, just as also the drinking of medicine itself; for he does not wish it, but wishes it for the sake of this.
ἔτι καθʼ οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν φίλοι.
Further, in the ways in which those who are not excellent would also be friends to each other.
εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ᾗ φαῦλος, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός.
For he would be pleasant not in so far as he is bad, but in so far as he shares in something of common things, such as if he is musical.
ἔτι ᾗ ἔνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἔνιοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν ἂν καὶ σπουδαίῳ.
Further, in so far as there is something decent in all; therefore some would be sociable even to an excellent person.
ἢ ᾗ προσαρμόττουσιν ἑκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γάρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
Or in so far as they fit each one; for all have something of the good.