§7.2#3ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατʼ ἀρετήν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοί.
Therefore, since the primary friendship is in accordance with virtue, they themselves will also be absolutely good.
τοῦτο δʼ οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι, ἀλλʼ ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν.
And this is not because they are useful, but in another way; for "the good for someone" and "the absolutely good" have a double meaning.
καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων.
And just as in the case of the useful, so also in the case of states.
ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι.
For the absolutely useful is different from the useful of such a kind as undergoing medical treatment.
ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετή.
Thus also the virtue of a human being, which is a state, is likewise.
ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνῳ.
For let us suppose that a human being is one of those who are good by nature; for the virtue of the one who is good by nature is absolutely good, but that of the one who is not, is good for him.
ὁμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
Likewise also with the pleasant.
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον, καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φιλία, καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, κἂν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται.
For here we must stop and consider whether friendship is without pleasure, and how it differs, and in which of the two loving consists: whether because he is good, even if he is not pleasant (yet not because of this, since loving is said in two ways), or because loving in activity seems to be a good thing and not without pleasure.
δῆλον δʼ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν.
And it is clear that just as in knowledge recent contemplations and learnings are felt most in pleasure, so also are the recognitions of familiar people, and the same reasoning applies to both.
φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ.
At least, by nature the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and to those for whom it is good, it is pleasant.
διὸ εὐθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἥδιστον ἄνθρωπος.
For this reason, those who are similar immediately rejoice in each other, and to a human being, a human being is most pleasant.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος.
So since this is so even for the incomplete, it is clear that it is so also for the perfected; and the excellent person is perfect.
εἰ δὲ τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα.
If, then, loving in activity with pleasure is the mutual choice of each other's acquaintance, it is clear that also as a whole the primary friendship is the mutual choice of absolutely good and pleasant things because they are good and pleasant.
ἔστι δʼ αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἕξις ἀφʼ ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις.
And this friendship is a state from which such choice arises.
τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δʼ οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φιλοῦντι, δυνάμεως δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον.
For its work is activity, and this is not outside, but in the lover himself, and outside of all active power; for power is either in another or as another.
διὸ τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν.
Therefore, loving is rejoicing, but not being loved.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ·
For being loved is the activity of the beloved, but loving is also the activity of friendship.
φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα.
And the former occurs in a living being, but the latter also in an inanimate thing; for even inanimate things are loved.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν τὸ φιλούμενον ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ᾗ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ᾗ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ᾗ μουσικὸς ἢ ᾗ ἰατρικός· ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ, ᾗ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική.
And since loving in activity is using the beloved as beloved, and the friend is beloved to the friend as friend, but not as musical or as medical; therefore, the pleasure from him, as himself, is friendly.
αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος.
For one loves him himself, not because he is something else.
ὥστʼ ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ᾗ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φιλία.
So, if one does not rejoice in him as good, it is not the primary friendship.
οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθὲν τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν.
Nor should any of the accidents prevent more than the good gives pleasure.
τί γὰρ σφόδρα δυσώδης λείπεται;
For what if someone who is exceedingly bad-smelling is left?
ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, συζῇ δὲ μή.
For he is loved with goodwill, but not lived with.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι διʼ αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦνται.
This, then, is the primary friendship, which all agree upon; but the others are both thought to be so and are disputed because of this.
βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνη δʼ αὕτη βέβαιος.
For friendship seems to be something stable; but only this one is stable.
τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως ποιεῖ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν.
For what has been judged is stable, and those things that do not happen quickly or easily make the judgment correct.
οὐκ ἔστι δʼ ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου.
And there is no stable friendship without trust; and trust is not without time.
δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις· "
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου. "
οὐδʼ ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ὡς φιλία.
For one must make trial, just as Theognis also says: "For you would not know the mind of a man or of a woman, before you make trial of them just as of a beast of burden." Nor is one a friend without time, but they wish to be friends, and such a state most of all escapes notice as being friendship.
ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχωσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθʼ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις, οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλʼ εἶναι φίλοι.
For when they are eagerly disposed to be friends, by rendering all friendly services to each other, they think they do not just wish to be friends, but are friends.
τὸ δʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ εἰ φίλοι βούλονται, ἤδη καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν.
But just as happens in other things, it happens also in friendship; for it is not because they wish to be healthy that they are healthy, so that not even if they wish to be friends are they already friends.
σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πεῖραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες.
And here is a sign: for those who are disposed in this way without trial are easily slandered; for concerning those things about which they have given trial to each other, they are not easily slandered, but concerning those about which they have not, they might be persuaded when the slanderers speak of signs.
ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ φιλία· ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὑτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους.
At the same time, it is clear that this friendship is not among the bad either; for the bad man is untrustworthy and malicious towards everyone; for he measures others by himself.
διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πεῖραν ἀπιστῶσιν.
Therefore, the good are more easily deceived, unless they are untrustworthy because of trial.
οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἱροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα.
But the bad choose things that are good by nature instead of the friend, and no one loves a human being more than things.
ὥστʼ οὐ φίλοι.
So they are not friends.