§7.3τρία μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατʼ ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία.
These then are the three species of friendship; and in all of these, friendship is spoken of in a way in accordance with equality.
καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πώς εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις.
For indeed, friends in accordance with virtue are in a way friends to each other in equality of virtue.
ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ καθʼ ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον.
But another difference of these is that in accordance with superiority, as the virtue of God is to a human being.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατʼ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατʼ ἀριθμὸν δʼ οὐκ ἴσον.
For this is another species of friendship, and in general that of ruler and ruled, just as justice also is different; for it is equal in accordance with proportion, but not equal in accordance with number.
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα.
In this genus belong father to son, and the benefactor to the beneficiary.
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσίν· ἄλλη πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἣ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα.
And there are differences among these themselves: that of father to son is different from that of husband to wife, the latter being as ruler and ruled, and the former being as benefactor to beneficiary.
ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι.
And in these, being loved in return either does not exist or does not exist in the same way.
γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις ἐγκαλοίη τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.
For it would be ridiculous if anyone should accuse God because being loved in return is not in the same way as He is loved, or the ruler and the ruled.
φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον.
For being loved, not loving, belongs to the ruler, or loving in another way.
καὶ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἥ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ.
And pleasure differs in no way, both that of the self-sufficient person over his own possession or child, and that of the needy person over what is coming to be.
ὡς δʼ αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διʼ ἡδονὴν οἳ μὲν κατʼ ἰσότητα εἰσίν, οἳ δὲ καθʼ ὑπεροχήν.
And in the same way, among friends because of utility and those because of pleasure, some are in accordance with equality, and others in accordance with superiority.
διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς.
Therefore those who think in the former way complain if they are not equally useful and do good, and likewise in the case of pleasure.
δῆλον δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις.
This is clear in love affairs; for this is the cause of their often fighting with each other.
ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν.
For the lover is ignorant that they do not have the same account regarding their eagerness.
διὸ εὑρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ ἐρώμενος· τοιαῦτʼ ἂν οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι.
Therefore the beloved says that he has found a quarrel; a non-lover would not say such things.
οἳ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.
But they think that the account is the same.
§7.4ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας, κατʼ ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν διῄρηνται εἰς δύο· αἳ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἳ δὲ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν εἰσίν.
As, then, has been said, there being three species of friendship—in accordance with virtue, in accordance with the useful, and in accordance with the pleasant—these again are divided into two: for some are in accordance with the equal, and others in accordance with superiority.
φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δʼ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται.
Now both are friendships, but those in accordance with equality are friends; for it would be absurd if a man were a friend to a child, yet he does love and is loved.
ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν.
And in some cases, the superior must be loved, but if he loves, he is reproached as loving one who is unworthy.
τῇ γὰρ ἀξίᾳ τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καί τινι ἴσῳ.
For it is measured by the worth of the friends and by a certain equality.
τὰ μὲν οὖν διʼ ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν.
Therefore, some are unworthy of being loved equally because of lack of age, and others because of virtue or birth or some other such superiority.
ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἧττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ κατʼ ἀρετήν.
But always the superior claims either to love less or not to love, both in the useful and in the pleasant and in accordance with virtue.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δʼ ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν)· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ, οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν.
Now in small superiorities, disputes naturally arise (for the small in some cases has no force, just as in the weight of wood, but in gold; but they judge the small badly; for one's own good seems great because of being near, and another's small because of being far off); but when there is an excess, they do not even themselves seek that they should either be loved in return or loved in return equally, as if one should claim this of God.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μέν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δʼ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι.
It is clear then that they are friends when they are in the equal, but being loved in return is possible without being friends.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατʼ ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή.
And it is also clear why human beings seek the friendship in accordance with superiority more than that in accordance with equality; for at the same time both being loved and superiority belong to them in this way.
διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρʼ ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ.
Therefore the flatterer is more honored than the friend by some; for he makes both appear to belong to the person flattered.
μάλιστα δʼ οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ.
And especially those who love honor are such; for being admired is in superiority.
φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἳ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἳ δὲ φιλότιμοι.
And by nature some become loving and others lovers of honor.
φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον.
And the loving person is the one who rejoices in loving rather than in being loved; but the other is rather a lover of honor.
ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός.
Now the one who rejoices in being admired and being loved is a friend of superiority; but the one who rejoices in the pleasure in loving is the loving person.
ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δʼ οὔ.
For there is a necessity when active; for being loved is accidental; for it is possible for one who is loved to be unaware of it, but not for one who loves.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ·
And it is also in accordance with friendship to love rather than to be loved, and being loved is in accordance with being lovable.
ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἄμφω, γιγνώσκειν ἢ γιγνώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἡ Ἀντιφῶντος.
And a sign is: the friend would choose rather, if both were not possible, to know than to be known, as women do in the cases of child-substitution, and Andromache in the play of Antiphon.
καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα.
For indeed wishing to be known seems to be for one's own sake, and for undergoing some good but not doing it, whereas knowing is for the sake of doing and loving.
διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλʼ οὐ γινώσκονται.
Therefore we also praise those who persist in loving towards the deceased; for they know, but are not known.