§7.2#2τούτων ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν πλείστων φιλία (διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία
"Γλαῦκʼ ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τὸν σοφὸν φίλον ἔσκε μάχηται,"
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οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας,
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) ἡ δὲ διʼ ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων (τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετάβολος φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἤθη κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ), ἡ δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.
Of these, the friendship through the useful is that of the majority of people (for they love each other because they are useful, and up to this point, just as the proverb says "Glaucus, an ally, is a friend to a wise man as long as he fights," and "the Athenians no longer know the Megarians,") while the friendship through pleasure is that of the young (for they have a perception of this; therefore the friendship of the young is easily changed; for as their characters change according to their age, the pleasant also changes), and that in accordance with virtue is that of the best.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
It is clear from these things that the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual love and mutual choice of each other.
φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν.
For the object of love is dear to the one who loves, but a friend to the object of love is the one who returns this love.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία (μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως)· αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς οἱ μάντεις τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν.
This friendship, then, exists only in human beings (for only they perceive choice); but the others exist also in wild beasts, and the useful appears to be present to a small extent both towards humans for tame animals and towards each other, as Herodotus says of the trochilus to the crocodile, and as the diviners speak of the assemblies and separations of birds.
καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.
And the bad would also be friends to each other both through the useful and through the pleasant.
οἳ δʼ ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὔ φασι φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὅ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον, οἱ δʼ ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς.
But some, because the primary does not belong to them, say that they are not friends; for the bad man will do wrong to the bad man, and those who are wronged do not love each other.
οἳ δὲ φιλοῦσι μέν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τάς γε ἑτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει.
But others do love, though not with the primary friendship, since nothing prevents them from having the other friendships.
διʼ ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οὐ δοκοῦσι δʼ οὐδʼ οἱ διʼ ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατʼ ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη.
For because of pleasure they tolerate each other while being harmed, just as those who are incontinent do; and those who love each other because of pleasure do not seem to be friends either, when people inquire with precision, because it is not the primary friendship.
ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος.
For that one is stable, but this one is unstable.
ἣ δʼ ἐστὶ μέν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης.
But it is indeed friendship, as has been said, yet not that one, but derived from that one.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐστί, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθʼ ἕνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδύνατον.
To say, then, that only that one is a friend is to force the phenomena and of necessity to speak paradoxes; but to define all under a single definition is impossible.
λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνη ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε καθʼ ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἕν.
It remains, therefore, in this way: that in one sense only the primary is friendship, but in another sense all are, neither as homonymous and having relations with each other by chance, nor under a single species, but rather in relation to one thing.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅμα, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὁ δʼ ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ πρῶτος ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ διʼ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς αἱρετός (ἀνάγκη δʼ εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεταί τις διʼ αὑτὸν εἶναι τἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δʼ ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς.
And since what is absolutely good and what is absolutely pleasant are the same and together, unless something prevents them, and the true friend and primary friend is absolutely of this kind, and such a friend is chosen for himself (and it is necessary to be of this kind; for as one wishes for good things to be for oneself for their own sake, so one must choose the friend to exist), and the true friend is also absolutely pleasant; for this reason, even one who is a friend in any way at all seems pleasant.
ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον· ἔχει ἐπίστασιν, πότερον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον, καὶ πότερον τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθʼ ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡδύ, ἢ οὔ.
But we must define more concerning this; for it presents a matter for consideration, whether what is good for oneself or what is absolutely good is a friend, and whether loving in activity is with pleasure, so that the beloved is also pleasant, or not.
ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταὐτὸ συνακτέον· τά τε γὰρ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἁπλῶς τύχῃ φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά.
For both must be brought together to the same point; for those things that are not absolutely good but absolutely bad are by chance to be avoided, and what is not good for oneself is nothing to oneself, but this is what is sought, that the absolutely good things should be good in this way.
ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν· ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι.
For the absolutely good is chosen, but for oneself, what is good for oneself is chosen; which must agree.
καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται.
And virtue does this, and political science is for this purpose, so that for those in whom it does not yet exist, it may come to be.
εὐθέτως δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὤν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυὴς ἀφυοῦς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα.
And a human being is well adapted and on the way to this (for by nature the absolutely good things are good for him), and likewise a man in comparison with a woman, and a gifted person in comparison with an ungifted one, and the way is through the pleasant; for the noble must be pleasant.
ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὔπω σπουδαῖον τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τἀγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.
But when this disagrees, one is not yet completely excellent; for it is possible for incontinence to arise, for incontinence is the disagreement of the good and the pleasant in the passions.