§7.2#1ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις.
Therefore, we must adopt a method which will best account for us both the accepted opinions on these matters, and at the same time solve the puzzles and the contradictions.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις.
And this will be the case if the contrary opinions are shown to be plausible; for such an argument will be in the highest agreement with the phenomena.
συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ.
But the contradictions happen to remain if what is said is true in one sense but not in another.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φιλούμενον.
And it also presents a puzzle whether the object of love is the pleasant or the good.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον (οὐθεὶς γὰρ
"
ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ,
"
) ʼἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ ὃ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν·
For if we love that which we desire, and love is especially of this kind (for "there is no lover who does not always love"), and desire is for the pleasant, in this way the object of love would be the pleasant; but if it is what we wish for, it would be the good.
ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
But the pleasant and the good are different.
περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε.
Concerning these and other matters akin to them, we must try to define them, taking this as a starting point.
τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.
For the object of desire and of wish is either the good or the apparent good.
διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν.
For this reason, the pleasant is also an object of desire; for it is a certain apparent good.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ.
For to some it seems so, while to others it appears so even if it does not seem so to them.
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα.
For imagination and opinion do not reside in the same part of the soul.
ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον.
However, it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are objects of love.
τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν.
This being defined, we must take another hypothesis.
τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὔ.
For of goods, some are good absolutely, and others are so for someone, but not absolutely.
καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδέα.
And the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαμεν σώματι συμφέροντα ἁπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὔ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς.
For we say that the things beneficial to a healthy body are absolutely good for the body, but those for a sick body are not, such as taking medicine and surgical cuts.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἁπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὁλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι ἐναντίως.
Likewise, things absolutely pleasant to the body are those pleasant to one that is healthy and complete, such as seeing in the light and not in the darkness; although for one with sore eyes it is the opposite.
καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ὄξος παρεγχέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει.
And the more pleasant wine is not that for the person whose tongue has been ruined by heavy drinking (for they do not even pour in vinegar for such a person), but that for the undamaged sense.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλʼ ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν.
And likewise with the soul, and not the things pleasant to children and wild beasts, but to those who are mature.
ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνημένοι ταῦθʼ αἱρούμεθα.
At any rate, remembering both, we choose the latter.
ὡς δʼ ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον.
And as a child and a beast stand to a mature man, so the bad and foolish man stands to the decent and wise man.
τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.
And to these, the things pleasant are those in accordance with their states; and these are the good and the noble.
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδʼ εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων διʼ ἕκαστον τούτων ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαί τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον.
Since, then, goods are spoken of in many ways (for we call one thing good because of its being of such a character, and another because of its being beneficial and useful), and furthermore, of the pleasant, one kind is pleasant absolutely and good absolutely, while another is pleasant for someone and an apparent good; just as in the case of inanimate things we can choose and love something for each of these reasons, so too with a human being.
τὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδε καὶ διʼ ἀρετήν, τὸν δʼ ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δʼ ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ διʼ ἡδονήν.
For we love one because of his being of such a character and through virtue, another because he is beneficial and useful, and another because he is pleasant and through pleasure.
φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλῇ, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.
A friend, then, comes to be when one who is loved returns this love, and this is not unknown to them in some way.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθʼ ἓν ἁπάσας μηδʼ ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως.
Therefore, there must be three species of friendship, and they are neither all spoken of in respect of one thing nor as species of one genus, nor are they spoken of entirely homonymously.
πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν. καὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον.
For they are spoken of in relation to one and primary thing, just as the word "medical." For we speak of a "medical soul," a "medical body," a "medical tool," and a "medical work," but properly of the first.
πρῶτον δʼ οὗ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει.
And the first is that of which the definition is present in us.
οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικὸν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου.
For example, a medical tool is "that which a doctor would use"; but the definition of the tool is not present in the definition of the doctor.
ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος.
Therefore, the first is sought everywhere; but because the first is universal, they take it to be also universally first, and this is false.
ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντʼ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα.
Consequently, concerning friendship too, they cannot account for all the phenomena.
οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἑνὸς λόγου οὐκ οἴονται τὰς ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἳ δʼ εἰσὶ μέν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσίν·
For because one definition does not fit, they do not think the other friendships exist; but they do exist, though not in the same way.
οἳ δʼ ὅταν ἡ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ, ὡς οὖσαν καθόλου ἄν, εἴπερ ἦν πρώτη, οὐδʼ εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἴδη φιλίας.
And others, when the first does not fit, on the ground that it would be universal if indeed it were first, say that the others are not even friendships; but there are many species of friendship.
τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ διώρισται διʼ ἀρετήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἣ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.
For they were already among the things mentioned, since friendship has been defined as being spoken of in three ways: for one is defined through virtue, another through the useful, and another through the pleasant.