§7.12#1σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις.
Concerning self-sufficiency and friendship, we must also consider how they relate to each other's powers.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ φίλος.
For one might raise the question whether, if someone were self-sufficient in all respects, he will have a friend.
εἰ κατʼ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετʼ ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου;
If a friend is sought because of need, and the good person who is happy with virtue will be most self-sufficient, why should he need a friend?
οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὑτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι.
For the self-sufficient person needs neither useful things nor those that give pleasure, nor living together; for he is himself sufficient to be with himself.
μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδʼ ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου.
And this is most obvious in the case of God; for it is clear that since He needs nothing, He will not need a friend either, nor will He have any master.
ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλʼ ἢ καθʼ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη.
Consequently, the happiest human being also will least need a friend, except in so far as it is impossible for him to be self-sufficient.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλʼ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἱρετῶν.
Therefore, it is necessary for the one who lives best to have the fewest friends, and for them to become fewer and fewer, and not to be eager that there should be friends, but to disregard not only useful friends but also those chosen for living together.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδʼ ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος.
But indeed, even then it would seem to be clear that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit, but that the friend through virtue is the only true friend.
ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπλαυσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ποιήσοντας.
For when we are in need of nothing, then we all seek those who will share our enjoyment, and those who will receive benefits rather than those who will confer them.
ἀμείνω δʼ ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετʼ ἐνδείας, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.
And we have better judgment when we are self-sufficient than when we are in need, which is when we especially require friends who are worthy of living with.
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μή ποτε τὸ μέν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν.
But concerning this difficulty we must consider whether, while one part is said well, another part escapes our notice because of the comparison.
δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος.
And this will be clear to those who grasp what life in activity is, and how it is an end.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.
It is clear, then, that life is perceiving and knowing, so that living together is also perceiving together and knowing together.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὑτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὑτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὄρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνῶσιν τινά.
And perceiving oneself and knowing oneself is most desirable for each person, and for this reason the desire for life is innate in all; for one must define life as a kind of knowing.
εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσειε τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθʼ αὑτοῦ· τὸ δʼ ὅμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθʼ αὑτοῦ ἄλλον.
If, then, one were to cut off and make knowing itself exist by itself and not knowing oneself (though this escapes notice, as is written in the dialogue, yet in reality it is possible for it not to escape notice), it would differ in no way from knowing another instead of oneself; and this is similar to another living instead of oneself.
εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτερον.
Reasonably, then, perceiving and knowing oneself is more desirable.
δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν αἱρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν.
For one must combine two things together in the argument: both that life is desirable, and that it is good, and from these, that it is desirable for such a nature to belong to themselves.
εἰ οὖν ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἡ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως· ὥστε τὸ αὑτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαι ἐστίν.
If, then, one of the two columns in such a table of opposites is always in the class of the desirable, and the knowable and the perceivable are, to speak generally, so by sharing in the determinate nature; so that wishing to perceive oneself is wishing oneself to be of such a kind.
ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατʼ αὐτούς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ᾗ καὶ οὗ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν.
Since, then, we are not each of these things in our own right, but by participating in the capacities in perceiving or knowing (for in perceiving, one becomes perceivable in this way and in this respect, according as he previously perceives, both in the manner and in the object, and in knowing, one becomes knowable); so that for this reason one also wishes always to live, because he wishes always to know, and this because he wishes himself to be the object known.
τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἱρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπουμένοις πως εὔηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὖσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον;
Now, choosing to live together might indeed seem to be in a way foolish to those who consider it (first of all, regarding things common also to other animals, such as eating together or drinking together; for what difference does it make whether these things happen when people are near each other or apart, if you subtract speech?
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε· μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δʼ ὁ φίλος, ἡ δʼ ὁμοιότης φιλία)·
Furthermore, even sharing in casual conversation is another such thing; and at the same time, it is impossible for self-sufficient friends either to teach or to learn; for the one who learns does not himself have what he ought, while when the friend teaches, the other does not have it, and likeness is friendship).
ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε, καὶ πάντες ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθʼ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὗ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας.
But indeed, it is apparent, and we all share in good things more pleasantly with our friends, to the extent that each falls to our share and of the best that one can; and of these things, for one it is bodily pleasure, for another musical contemplation, and for another philosophy.
καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ.
And it is necessary to be together with the friend.
διό φησι "μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι", ὥστʼ οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου.
Therefore it is said, "friends far away are a burden," so that one must not be apart from each other when this is happening.
ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατʼ αἴσθησιν.
Hence love also seems to be similar to friendship; for the lover desires to live together, but not in the way that is most proper, but rather in a sensory way.
ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δʼ ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεταί πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν.
Thus, the argument says those things while raising difficulties, but the actual fact appears to happen in this way, so that it is clear that the disputant somehow misleads us.
σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τἀληθές.
We must consider where the truth lies.
ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός.
For a friend wishes to be, as the proverb says, "another Heracles," another oneself.
διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφʼ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἕτερος ἕτερον.
But what is found in one person is divided, and it is difficult for all to belong to one; but according to nature, it is the most closely related, and according to the body, another who is similar, and according to the soul, another, and of these, according to each part, one in one way and another in another.