§7.11περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φίλου, σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ.
But concerning the good friend and the friend according to virtue, we must consider whether one ought to render useful services and help to that person, or to the one who makes a counter-claim and is able to do so.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημα ἐστί, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον.
This is the same problem as whether one ought to benefit the friend or the excellent person more.
ἂν μὲν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν, ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικῆ δὲ ἠρέμα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὃ δὲ ἔσται, οὔπω δέ, ἢ ὃ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δʼ οὔ, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον.
For if the friend is also excellent, perhaps it is not very difficult, unless one exaggerates the one and depreciates the other, making him out to be an intense friend but only slightly decent; but otherwise, many problems arise, as for instance, if the one was but will not be, and the other will be but is not yet, or if the one has become but is not, and the other is but was not and will not be; but that other case is more troublesome.
μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, ποιήσας
"
λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,
ἔργον δʼ ἐκεῖνος ἔργον ὃς παρέσχετο. "
καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἄλλʼ ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ.
For does Euripides not say something to the point when he wrote: "As a just reward for words you may bring words, but let him who provided a deed receive a deed." And one must not give everything to one's father, but there are other things that one must give to one's mother, although the father is superior.
οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδʼ ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ.
For not even to Zeus is everything sacrificed, nor does he hold all honors, but only some; perhaps, therefore, there are some things that one must give to the useful friend, and other things to the good friend.
οἷον οὐχ εἰ σῖτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδʼ ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος.
For instance, if someone gives food and necessaries, it does not follow that one must live with him; nor, conversely, must one give to the one with whom one must live the things which this person does not give but which the useful friend does.
ἀλλʼ οἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι.
But those who do this and give everything to their beloved, when they ought not, are worth nothing.
καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μέν πώς εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς.
And the definitions of friendship in discourse are indeed all in a way definitions of friendship, but not of the same friendship.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθʼ ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν·
For to the useful friend, and to the benefactor, and to the person of the right sort (for this definition of friendship does not specify which), belongs wishing good things to that person; but to another belongs wishing existence, and to another living together, and to the friend according to pleasure sharing in pain and joy.
πάντες δʼ οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δʼ οὐδείς.
All these definitions are indeed said in reference to some friendship, but none of them is directed toward one single friendship.
διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὤν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις.
Therefore, they are many, and each seems to belong to a single friendship, though it does not—for instance, the choice of the other's existence.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὑτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.
For the one who is superior and has benefited another also wishes his own work to exist, and to the one who gave existence, one must also make a return; but one should not live with this person, but with the pleasant friend.
ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλʼ οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκείνους οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ.
Some friends wrong each other; for they love the things more, and not the person who possesses them; therefore, one loves those people also in the same way as, because it is pleasant, he chose wine, and because it is useful, he chose wealth; for wealth is more useful.
διὸ οὐ δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀντὶ ἥττονος.
Therefore, one ought not to be angry, just as if one chose the superior thing instead of the inferior.
οἳ δʼ ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.
But they complain; for they now seek that good friend, having previously sought the pleasant or the useful one.