§7.10#3ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν.
Therefore, the political [friendship] looks to the agreement and to the transaction, and the moral to the choice.
ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική.
And so this is also more just, and is friendly justice.
αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη.
And the cause of disputes is that while moral friendship is more noble, the friendship of utility is more necessary.
οἳ δʼ ἄρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ διʼ ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δʼ ἄντικρυς ᾖ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν.
People begin as if they were moral friends and as being so through virtue; but when some private interest is openly at stake, they clearly show that they were different.
ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν.
For it is from superabundance that the majority pursue what is noble, and therefore also the more noble friendship.
ὥστε φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων.
So it is clear how one should decide concerning these matters.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ δʼ ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν· ἂν δʼ ὃ μὲν φῇ ὧδε ὃ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ οὐ διείποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μηδʼ ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν.
For if they are moral friends, one must look to whether their choice is equal, and nothing more should be claimed by one from the other; but if as useful and political friends, they agree on what would be profitable; and when one says this and the other that, it is not noble to make a counter-claim, while it is duty to speak noble words, and likewise on the part of the other; but since they did not make a clear agreement as moral friends, someone must judge, and neither of them should deceive the other by acting a part.
ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην.
And so he must acquiesce in his fortune.
ὅτι δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῴη διʼ ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἠδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας.
And that moral friendship is according to choice is clear; since even if one who has received great benefits does not make a return through inability, but only as much as he was able, he acts creditably; and even God is content to receive sacrifices according to our ability.
ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἕξει, ἂν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.
But to a seller, it will not be sufficient if one says they cannot pay more, nor to a lender.
πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις τοῖς μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον.
Many complaints arise in friendships that are not on the same line, and it is not easy to see what is just.
χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἑνὶ τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν.
For it is difficult to measure by any single standard things that are not on the same line, as happens, for instance, in love affairs.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὃ δʼ ἐκεῖνον ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσηται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γινομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντί τινος, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης διεφέροντο καὶ ὡς διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἑνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Ἡρόδικος ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς.
For the one pursues the other as pleasant for the sake of living together, while the other sometimes pursues the former as useful; but when love ceases, as the one changes, the other also changes, and then they reckon up everything. This is like the dispute between Python and Pammenes, and that between teacher and pupil (for knowledge and money are not measured by one and the same standard), and like the physician Herodicus against the one who offered him a small fee, and like the cithara-player and the king.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ, ὃ δʼ ὡς χρησίμῳ ὡμίλει· ὃ δʼ ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον ᾄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ.
For the one associated with him as pleasant, and the other as useful; but when the time came to make a return, the latter made himself out to be pleasant, and said that just as the musician had pleased him by singing, so he too had pleased the musician by making a promise.
ὅμως δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἑνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅρῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία.
Nevertheless, it is clear here too how one must decide; for here also they must be measured by one thing, not by a fixed limit, but by a ratio; for they must be measured by what is proportional, just as political association is measured.
πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα;
For how will a shoemaker associate with a farmer unless their products are equalized proportionally?
τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατʼ εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὃ δʼ ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον.
And for those not on the same line, the proportional is the measure—as, for example, if one complains of having given wisdom and the other money, the ratio of wisdom to wealth, and then what was given on each side.
εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἥμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὃ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ.
For if one gave half of the smaller thing and the other not even a tiny fraction of the greater, it is clear that the latter is in the wrong.
ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὃ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὃ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ὡς κατʼ ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.
And here too there is a dispute at the beginning, if the one says they came together as useful to each other, and the other denies this, claiming it was for some other kind of friendship.