§7.10#2ἡ δὲ κατʼ ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική.
On the other hand, the friendship based on equality is political friendship.
ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως
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οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας
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καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλʼ ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία·
And political friendship is indeed based on utility, and just as states are friends to one another, so also are citizens; and likewise, 'Athenians no longer recognize Megarians,' so also the citizens, when they are no longer useful to one another, but their friendship is from hand to hand.
ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἴσον ᾖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας.
And there is here both ruler and ruled, yet neither of the natural nor of the royal kind, but that which is in turn; nor is it for the sake of God doing good, but in order that there may be equality of the good and of the service.
κατʼ ἰσότητα δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία.
So political friendship wishes to be based on equality.
ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἴδη δύο, ἣ μὲν νομικὴ ἣ δʼ ἠθική.
And there are two kinds of the friendship of utility: the one legal, the other moral.
βλέπει δʼ ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι.
Now the political [legal] friendship looks to the equal and to the transaction, like buyers and sellers.
διὸ εἴρηται
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μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ. "
ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθʼ ὁμολογίαν ᾖ ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, νομική· ὅταν δʼ ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική.
Therefore it is said, 'A reward for a friend.' So when this political friendship is by agreement, it is legal; but when they commit to each other, it wishes to be moral and companionable friendship.
διὸ μάλιστα ἔγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν.
Therefore complaints are most frequent in this friendship; and the cause is that it is contrary to nature.
ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἡ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· οἳ δʼ ἀμφότερα βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου ἕνεκα, ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν.
For the friendship of utility and that of virtue are different; but they want to have both at once, and while they associate for the sake of utility, they make it moral as if they were decent men, and therefore, as if trusting, they do not make it legal.
ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δʼ ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ χρήσιμοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται)· ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος.
For in general, among the three, complaints are most frequent in the friendship of utility (for virtue is free from complaints, and those who associate for pleasure part after receiving and giving; but those who are useful do not immediately dissolve their relation unless they deal with each other legally and companionably); nevertheless, within the friendship of utility, the legal is free from complaints.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ ἑκούσιος.
And legal settlement is made in relation to money (for the equal is measured by this), while the moral is voluntary.
διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι δίκας τῶν ἑκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκαιον εἶναι, οἳ δʼ ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν.
Therefore, in some places there is a law for those who associate friendly in this way, that there should be no lawsuits concerning voluntary transactions, and rightly so; for justice does not naturally exist for good men, and they transact as good and trustworthy men.
ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.
But in this friendship, the complaints are ambiguous to both, as to how each makes his complaint, when they have trusted each other morally and not legally.
καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθὲν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι.
And indeed, it presents a difficulty as to how one should judge what is just: whether by looking at the service rendered, how great it was, or what kind of thing it was to the recipient.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θέογνις· "
σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα. "
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτʼ εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δʼ εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα.
For indeed what Theognis says can happen: 'To you, O goddess, this is small, but to me it is great.' And the contrary can also happen, as in the saying, 'This is play to you, but death to me.' And from this, complaints are said to arise.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησιν, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὃ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ.
For the one claims a return on the ground of having rendered a great service, because he did it for the other in need, or some other such thing, speaking in relation to the other's benefit, how much it was capable of, and not what it was to himself; while the other on the contrary claims how much it was to that person, and not how much to himself.
ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὃ δʼ ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὃ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὃ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει.
And sometimes, shifting viewpoints, one also disputes; for the one states how small it turned out for himself, and the other how great its capacity was for himself—for example, if someone at risk benefited another to the value of a drachma, the one claims the greatness of the risk, the other that of the money, just as in the repayment of coins.
καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότʼ ἦν, ὃ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείπωνται.
For there too the dispute is about these things; for unless they made a clear agreement, one claims how it was then, and the other how it is now.