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Aristotle · Eudemian Ethics §3.2#1

Temperance, Intemperance, and Pleasures of Touch and Taste

Passage 25 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Concludes the discussion on courage and initiates the inquiry into temperance and intemperance. After clarifying the multiple meanings of "intemperate" (unchastened), the author limits the pleasures concerned with these virtues to the bodily senses of taste and touch, specifically touch.

§3.2#1περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς·
what kind of things, then, courage is a mean, and of what things, and for what reason, and what power the fearful things have, has been pretty much sufficiently said according to the present inquiry.
περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον.
Next, we must try to discuss temperance and intemperance.
λέγεται δʼ ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς.
Now "the intemperate" is spoken of in many ways.
ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μηδʼ ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατός, ὃ δʼ ἀδύνατος·
For both he who has not been chastened in any way nor cured is so called, just as "the uncut" is that which has not been cut; and of these, one is capable [of being chastened], the other incapable.
ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ.
For "uncut" means both that which is incapable of being cut and that which is capable but has not been cut.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον.
And in the same way with "the intemperate" (unchastened).
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκοκασίαν.
For both that which is not of a nature to admit of chastisement, and that which is of such a nature but has not been chastened concerning the errors in which the temperate man acts rightly, like children; for children are called intemperate (undisciplined) according to this kind of intemperance.
ἔτι δʼ ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.
And in another way, those who are cured with difficulty or are altogether incurable by chastisement.
πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν.
But although intemperance is spoken of in many ways, it is clear that it is concerned with certain pleasures and pains, and that in being disposed in a certain way towards these, they differ both from one another and from the other states; and we have outlined before how we metaphorically transfer the name of intemperance.
τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας διʼ ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἳ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους, οἳ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν.
But those who are unmoved because of insensibility towards these same pleasures, some call "insensible," while others address such people by other names.
ἔστι δʼ οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδʼ ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἧτταν καὶ αἴσθησιν.
But this condition is not very well known nor common, because everyone is more prone to err in the other direction, and defeat by and perception of such pleasant things is inborn in everyone.
μάλιστα δʼ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἳ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν.
And such people are most of all like those whom the comic poets bring on the stage as "rustics," who do not approach pleasant things even in moderate or necessary measures.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι.
And since the temperate man is concerned with pleasures, he must of necessity also be concerned with certain desires.
δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας.
We must, then, grasp with what kind.
οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δʼ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν·
For the temperate man is not temperate concerning all desires nor all pleasant things, but according to opinion concerning two of the sensible objects, both the gustatory and the tactile, but in truth concerning the tactile.
περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς διʼ ὀσφρήσεως, τάς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων.
For concerning the pleasure through sight of beautiful things without sexual desire, or pain at ugly things, and concerning that through hearing of harmonious or discordant things, and furthermore towards those through smell, both those from fragrance and those from stench, the temperate man is not concerned.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν.
For neither is anyone called intemperate by being affected or not affected by these.
εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ᾄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο μήτε ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δʼ ᾀδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν.
If, at any rate, someone looking at a beautiful statue or horse or human, or listening to someone singing, should not wish either to eat or drink or have sexual relations, but only to look at the beautiful things and listen to the singers, he would not seem to be intemperate, just as neither are those who are charmed by the Sirens.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά.
But it is only concerning these two sensible objects, concerning which the other beasts also happen to have sensation, both rejoicing and being pained, namely, the gustatory and the tactile.

Notes

  1. 1230b1ἄτμητον — Explains the ambiguity of adjectives ending in -tos (expressing either "not being ..." as a state/passive, or "incapable of being ..."). Aristotle uses this linguistic analogy to show that akolastos likewise carries a double meaning of "not having been chastened" and "incapable of being chastened."
  2. 1230b5περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων — The antecedent of the relative pronoun has is the preceding hamartias (errors, faults). The intransitive verb orthopragei (acts rightly) takes the relative pronoun has (accusative) to mean "acts rightly in respect of those things [in which others err]."
  3. 1230b13τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας — The construction of echo with an adverb (akinetos echein) means "to be in a certain state." Here, the participial phrase refers to "those who are in an unmoved state," acting not as the subject of the sentence, but as the direct object (accusative) of the main verb kalousin.
  4. 1230b30οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων — The main verb of a long sentence (1230b26-30). Multiple prepositional phrases starting with peri and pros (concerning pleasures and pains of sight, hearing, and smell) all modify ouk estin ho sophron (the temperate man is not [concerned with them]), making the overall sentence structure crucial for comprehension.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics §3.2#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg009.humanitext-grc2:3.2%231

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