§3.1#3τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς· ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστʼ εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον.
Therefore, concerning the fearful things, about which we say the brave man is concerned, it has indeed been said that they are those that appear productive of destructive pain; these, however, appearing near and not far off, and being or appearing of such a magnitude as to be commensurate with man.
ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν.
For some things must of necessity appear fearful to every man and throw him into confusion.
οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἕξεις· οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.
For nothing prevents, just as heat and cold, and some of the other powers are beyond us and the states of the human body, so also with the passions concerning the soul.
οἱ μὲν οὖν δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἕξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερὰ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἠρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε φοβερὰ θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἠρέμα, τῷ δʼ ἀνδρείῳ τἀληθῆ μάλιστα.
Now cowards and daring men make false judgments because of their states; for to the coward even things that are not fearful seem to be fearful, and those that are slightly so seem extremely so, while to the daring man the opposite, both the fearful things seem encouraging and the extremely so seem slightly so, but to the brave man, the truths most of all.
διόπερ οὔτʼ εἴ τις ὑπομένοι τὰ φοβερὰ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένοι φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὔτʼ εἰ γιγνώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν.
Therefore, neither if someone should endure fearful things through ignorance is he brave, as if someone through madness should endure thunderbolts being hurled, nor if, knowing how great the danger is, he does so through anger, as the Celts take up arms and advance against the waves, and in general barbarian courage is accompanied by anger.
ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ διʼ ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετʼ ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας.
And some endure also for the sake of other pleasures; for indeed anger has a certain pleasure, since it is accompanied by the hope of vengeance.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὔτʼ εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτʼ εἰ διʼ ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως ἂν ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων.
But nevertheless, whether someone endures death because of this pleasure or because of another, or to escape greater pains, none of these would justly be called brave.
εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν διʼ ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος, τῶν ποιητικῶν δʼ αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ διʼ ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν οὐθεὶς ἂν ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἑτοίμως ἀποθνήσκειν.
For if dying were pleasant, the intemperate would often die through lack of self-control, just as even now, though dying itself is not pleasant, yet they fall into things that produce it through lack of self-control, knowing what they do; none of whom would seem to be brave, even if they die very readily.
οὔτʼ εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἀνδρεῖος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
"
φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν.
Nor if they do so to escape toil, which many do, is any of such people brave, just as Agathon also says: "For worthless mortals, overcome by toil, desire to die.
"
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕλκους ὀδύνην εὔξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα.
"just as the poets also mythologize that Chiron, because of the pain from his wound, prayed to die although he was immortal.
παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι διʼ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν.
And in a similar manner to these, also as many as endure dangers through experience, which is pretty much the way most military men endure them.
αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὐναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
For the matter is just the opposite of what Socrates thought, who believed that courage is knowledge.
οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε διʼ ὃ θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία.
For those who know how to climb the masts are bold, not because they know the fearful things, but because they know the resources against danger; nor is that through which they fight more boldly courage.
καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θέογνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν· "
πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος.
For indeed, strength and wealth would be courage according to Theognis: "For every man subdued by poverty...
"
φανερῶς δʼ ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι διʼ ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας.
"And clearly some who are cowards nevertheless endure through experience; and this because they do not think there is danger, since they know the resources.
σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη πλησίον ᾖ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν.
And this is proof: for when they think they have no resource, but the danger is already near, they do not endure.
ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν ἂν ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα· "
Ἕκτορα δʼ αἰδὼς εἷλε· "
καὶ
"
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.
But of all such kinds of courage, those who endure through shame would seem most of all to be brave, just as Homer also says that Hector endured the danger against Achilles: "But shame seized Hector; "and "Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach upon me.
"
καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη.
"And this is political courage.
ἡ δʼ ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτʼ ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται.
But true courage is neither this nor any of those, though it is similar, just as is that of wild beasts, which because of anger rush to meet the blow.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε διʼ ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν.
For they ought not to stand their ground fearing because they will fall into disrepute, nor because of wrath, nor because of not thinking they will die, or because of having protective powers; for in that way indeed one will not think that anything is fearful.
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστʼ οὔτε διʼ ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε διʼ ἡδονήν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.
But since every virtue is choice-involved (and how we say this has been told before, that it makes one choose everything for the sake of something, and this 'that for the sake of which' is the noble), it is clear that courage also, being a certain virtue, will make one endure fearful things for the sake of something, so that neither through ignorance (for virtue rather makes one judge correctly) nor through pleasure, but because it is noble; since, if it is not noble but mad, he does not endure it, for it is shameful.