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Aristotle · Eudemian Ethics §3.2#2

Intemperance in Tactile Pleasures and Temperance as the Mean

Passage 26 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle argues that the pleasures of beasts are restricted to touch (and the taste associated with the throat) rather than sight, hearing, or smell, and establishes that intemperance is concerned with the excess of these tactile pleasures. He defines temperance as the mean between this excess and the deficiency of insensibility.

§3.2#2περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος.
concerning the pleasant things of the other sensible objects, almost all beasts appear to be similarly insensibly disposed, as for example concerning harmony or beauty.
οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μή τί που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες·
For they appear to be affected in no way worth mentioning by the mere contemplation of beautiful things or by the listening to harmonious things, unless perhaps something monstrous has occurred.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας.
And neither towards fragrant or bad-smelling things; and yet they possess all their senses sharper than we do.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθʼ αὑτάς.
But even of smells they rejoice in those which delight by accident, and not in themselves.
λέγω δὲ μὴ καθʼ αὑτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (διʼ ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθʼ αὑτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσίν.
And I mean by "not in themselves" those in which we rejoice either by hoping or by remembering, as for example of dishes and drinks (for we rejoice in these because of another pleasure, namely that of eating or drinking), and "in themselves" those such as the smells of flowers.
διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.
Therefore Stratonicus aptly said that some smell beautiful, others pleasant.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδʼ ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλʼ ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἁφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος.
Since even of the pleasures concerning the gustatory, the beasts are not excited about every pleasure, nor about those of which the sensation is at the tip of the tongue, but about those at the pharynx, and the affection seems to be touch rather than taste.
διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος.
Therefore gourmands do not pray to have a long tongue, but the pharynx of a crane, like Philoxenus the son of Eryxis.
ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν.
So that, to speak simply, intemperance must be placed concerning the things touched.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν.
And similarly the intemperate man is concerned with such things.
οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται.
For wine-bibbing and gluttony and lust and gourmandise and all such things are concerned with the mentioned sensations, into which parts intemperance is divided.
περὶ δὲ τὰς διʼ ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος, ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἄνευ ὀνείδους τὰς ἁμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δʼ ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.
But concerning the pleasures through sight or hearing or smell, no one is called intemperate if he exceeds, but we blame these errors without reproach, and in general concerning all those things in which people are not called self-controlled; and the incontinent are neither intemperate nor temperate.
ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος.
Now insensible, or however one ought to name him, is he who is so disposed as to fall short even of those things which of necessity almost all share in and rejoice in; and he who exceeds is intemperate.
πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδʼ ἀνάλγητοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).
For all naturally rejoice in these, and conceive desires, and they neither are nor are called intemperate (for they do not exceed by rejoicing more than is necessary when obtaining them and being pained more than is necessary when not obtaining them), nor painless (for they do not fall short in rejoicing or being pained, but rather exceed).
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία.
And since there is excess and deficiency concerning these, it is clear that there is also a mean, and this state is the best, and contrary to both.
ὥστʼ εἰ σωφροσύνη ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἃ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὖσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· ἡ δʼ ἔλλειψις ἤτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη.
So that if temperance is the best state concerning the things with which the intemperate man is concerned, the mean concerning the mentioned pleasant things of the sensible objects would be temperance, being a mean between intemperance and insensibility; and the excess is intemperance; and the deficiency is either nameless or addressed by the mentioned names.
ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.
But a more precise distinction concerning the genus of pleasures will have to be made in what is said later concerning continence and incontinence.

Notes

  1. 1231a1ἅπαντα — This functions as the subject referring back to 'the beasts' mentioned at the end of the previous section, agreeing with the neuter plural nominative participle διακείμενα.
  2. 1231a2ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου — Forms a general negation with οὐθέν ('nothing whatsoever worth mentioning'), where καί functions as an intensifier.
  3. 1231a8αἷς — A relative pronoun in the dative case. The antecedent is 'smells' (feminine plural) implied from the preceding τῶν ὀσμῶν, and its case is governed by the verb χαίρομεν, which takes the dative.
  4. 1231a13ὅσων — A genitive relative pronoun referring to 'pleasures' from the context, functioning as a partitive genitive.
  5. 1231a31τῷ χαίρειν — An articular infinitive in the dative case, expressing the respect or sphere of action ('in rejoicing').

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics §3.2#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg009.humanitext-grc2:3.2%232

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