§3.1#2ἀπορεῖται δʼ εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδʼ ἂν φοβηθείη.
But the question is raised whether nothing is fearful to the brave man, and whether he would not fear at all.
ἢ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον;
Or does nothing prevent [him from fearing] in the way described?
ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει.
For courage is an following of reason, and reason bids one to choose what is noble.
διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἤτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος.
Therefore, he who does not endure these things for the sake of this is either out of his mind or daring; but he who is fearless for the sake of what is noble is alone brave.
ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δʼ ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν.
The coward, then, fears even what he ought not, while the daring man is bold even concerning what he ought not; but the brave man does both as he ought, and in this way is a mean.
ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται.
For whatever reason bids, these things he both dares and fears.
ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ.
But reason does not bid one to endure great painful and destructive things unless they are noble.
ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδʼ ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος, ἐὰν κελεύῃ.
The daring man, then, even if reason does not bid, dares these things, while the coward does not even if it bids; but the brave man alone, if it bids.
ἔστι δʼ εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθʼ ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά.
And there are five types of courage so called by way of similarity; for they endure the same things, but not for the same reasons.
μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ διʼ αἰδῶ οὖσα.
One is political; and this is that which exists because of shame.
δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.
The second is military; and this is because of experience and knowing, not as Socrates said, the fearful things, but that there are resources against fearful things.
τρίτη δʼ ἡ διʼ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, διʼ ἣν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἳ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα, οἳ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις.
The third is because of inexperience and ignorance, because of which children and madmen, the former endure what is brought against them, and the latter take hold of snakes.
ἄλλη δʼ ἡ κατʼ ἐλπίδα, καθʼ ἣν οἵ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος.
Another is that according to hope, according to which both those who have been highly successful often endure dangers, and those who are drunk; for wine makes them hopeful.
ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον διʼ ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν.
Another is because of irrational passion, such as because of love and anger.
ἄν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ διʼ ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως.
For if a man is in love, he is daring rather than cowardly, and endures many dangers, just as the one in Metapontum who killed the tyrant, and the one spoken of in the myths of Crete; and because of wrath and anger likewise.
ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός.
For anger is ecstatical.
διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς.
Therefore also wild boars seem to be brave, though they are not; for when they are ecstatic they are such, but otherwise they are inconsistent, just as the daring are.
ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται.
Yet the courage of anger is most of all natural; for anger is unconquerable, which is why children also fight best.
διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία.
But political courage is because of law.
κατʼ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.
In truth, however, none of these is courage, but all these are useful towards the encouragements in dangers.
περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον.
And concerning fearful things, we have now spoken of them absolutely, but it is better to define them more.
ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου.
In general, then, fearful things are said to be those that are productive of fear.
τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἄν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δʼ οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἵαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι.
And such are as many as appear productive of destructive pain; for to those who expect some other pain, some other pain or some other experience might perhaps occur, but there will be no fear, as if someone should foresee that he will feel pain of the sort that those who are envious feel, or such as those who are jealous or ashamed feel.
ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν.
But fear occurs only in the case of such pains as appear about to be, as many as are in their nature destructive of life.
διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσί, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ δειλοί.
Therefore also some who are extremely soft concerning some things are brave, and some who are hard and endurance-capable are cowardly.
καὶ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πώς.
And indeed it seems to be almost peculiar to courage to be in some state concerning death and the pain concerning this.
εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς ἀλέας καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός, ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ διʼ ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής· ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, οὗτος δʼ ἀνδρεῖος.
For if someone should be of such a kind as to be capable of enduring heat and cold and such pains, as reason [bids], since they are without danger, but soft and fearful towards death, not because of any other passion but because of the destruction itself, while another is soft towards those things, but unaffected towards death; the former would seem to be cowardly, and the latter brave.
καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν.
For indeed danger is spoken of only in the case of such of the fearful things, when that which is destructive of such destruction is near.
φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.
And danger appears when it appears near.