§2.9ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ ἔδει σκέψασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω διῃρήσθω (οἱ γὰρ μάλιστʼ ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἑκούσιον ὡς βίᾳ πράττοντες, ἀλλʼ ἑκόντες)·
So that, if it was necessary to examine the voluntary and involuntary also in relation to force, let this indeed be distinguished in this way (for those who most seem to prevent the voluntary as acting by force actually act voluntarily).
ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἑκούσιον ὥρισται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὁρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.
But since this has an end, and the voluntary has been defined neither by appetite nor by choice, it remains indeed to define what is in accordance with thought.
δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἤτοι ὡς τοδὶ μὲν πόμα, ἀλλʼ ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δʼ ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
Now, the voluntary seems to be opposite to the involuntary, and acting knowing either whom, or by what, or for the sake of what, is opposite to acting in ignorance of whom, and by what, and what, through ignorance, and not accidentally (for sometimes one knows indeed that he is his father, yet not in order to kill him but in order to save him, just as the daughters of Pelias did; or that this indeed is a drink, but as a love-potion and wine, whereas it was hemlock).
τὸ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, καὶ ὃ καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἑκούσιον.
And what is done through ignorance of what, by what, and whom, is involuntary; therefore the opposite is voluntary.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ ὂν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διʼ αὑτόν, ἑκούσια ταῦτʼ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτʼ ἐστίν· ὅσα δʼ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων.
Therefore, as many things as it is in one's power not to do, which one does not in ignorance and through oneself, these must of necessity be voluntary, and this is the voluntary; but as many things as one does in ignorance and because of being in ignorance, are involuntary.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἂν ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ διʼ ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο.
And since understanding and knowing are twofold, one being the possession and the other the use of knowledge, the one who possesses but does not use it might in one way be justly said to be in ignorance, but in another way not justly, as for example if he did not use it through negligence.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν, εἰ ὃ ῥᾴδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει διʼ ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην.
Likewise, one who does not possess knowledge would also be blamed, if he does not possess what was easy or necessary because of negligence or pleasure or pain.
ταῦτʼ οὖν προσδιοριστέον.
These things, then, must be further determined.