§2.10#1περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον·
Let the voluntary and involuntary, then, be defined in this way.
περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.
After this, let us speak about choice, first raising difficulties in our discussion concerning it.
διστάσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ποίῳ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἐστίν.
For one might doubt in what genus and in what kind of genus it is necessary to place it, and whether the voluntary and the object of choice are not the same, or are the same.
μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δʼ ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἡ προαίρεσις, ἤτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα.
Especially, it is said by some, and to one who investigates it might seem, that choice is one of two things, either opinion or desire; for both appear to accompany it.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρεξις φανερόν.
Now, that it is not desire is clear.
ἢ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων.
For it would be either wish or appetite or anger; for no one desires without having experienced any of these.
θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δʼ οὔ.
Now, anger and appetite belong even to wild beasts, but choice does not.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν.
Furthermore, even those to whom both of these belong choose many things without anger and appetite; and when they are in passions they do not choose, but hold out.
ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης.
Furthermore, appetite and anger are always with pain, but we choose many things even without pain.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταὐτόν.
But indeed, neither are wish and choice the same.
βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδʼ ὅλως ἃ δυνατὸν μέν, μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ δʼ οἴεται πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι.
For they wish for some even of impossible things knowing them to be so, as for instance to rule over all men and to be immortal, but no one chooses without being ignorant that it is impossible, nor in general what is possible indeed, but which he does not think is in his power to do or not to do.
ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι εἶναι.
So that this indeed is clear, that the object of choice must of necessity be some of the things in one's power.
ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδʼ ἁπλῶς εἴ τις οἴεταί τι.
Likewise, it is clear that it is not opinion either, nor simply if someone opines something.
τῶν γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον.
For the object of choice was some of the things in one's power, but we opine many of the things not in our power, as for instance that the diagonal is commensurable.
ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι προαίρεσις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.
Furthermore, there is no choice that is true or false.
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ᾗ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν.
Nor indeed is it the opinion concerning things in our power that are practicable, by which we happen to think we ought to do or not to do something.
κοινὸν δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δʼ οἷον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὐδʼ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα·
And this is common to opinion and wish; for no one chooses any end, but the means to the end; I mean, for instance, no one chooses to be healthy, but to walk or to sit for the sake of being healthy, nor to be happy, but to make money or to run risks for the sake of being happy.
καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου.
And in general, one who chooses always makes clear both what he chooses and for the sake of what; and the "for the sake of what" is the end for the sake of which he chooses something else, while the "what" is that which he chooses for the sake of something else.
βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν.
But wish is most of all for the end, and so is opining that one ought to be healthy and to fare well.
ὥστε φανερὸν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.
So that it is clear through these things that choice is different from both opinion and wish; for wishing and opinion are most of all of the end, but choice is not.