§2.8#2ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι.
Furthermore, both pleasure and pain are present in both.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἴεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν.
For the continent person suffers in acting contrary to his appetite already, and rejoices with the pleasure of hope that he will be benefited later, or is even now being benefited as he becomes healthy; and the incontinent person rejoices in obtaining, as he acts incontinently, what he desires, but suffers with the pain of hope, for he thinks he is doing what is bad.
ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν· κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων.
Therefore, to say that both act by force has some reason, and that because of desire and because of reasoning each sometimes acts involuntarily; for since both are separated, they are knocked out by each other.
ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν.
Hence, they transfer this also to the whole soul, because they see something of this sort among the parts in the soul.
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἡ δʼ ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δʼ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν.
Now, in the case of the parts, it is possible to say this; but the whole soul, both of the incontinent and of the continent person, acts voluntarily, and neither acts by force, but some one of the parts in them does, since we possess both by nature.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν.
For reasoning is present by nature, because if development is left alone and not maimed, it will be present, and appetite also is present, because it follows and is present immediately from birth.
σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίγνεται ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
And we define what is by nature by nearly these two criteria: both by all those things which follow immediately for those being born, and by all those things which happen to us as development is left to go straight, such as gray hair, old age, and other such things.
ὥστε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος πράττει, ἁπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν.
So that neither acts contrary to nature, but in a simple sense each acts in accordance with nature, though not the same nature.
αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ ἀπορίαι αὗται περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ πράττειν ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἢ τὸν ἕτερον, ὥστε ἢ μὴ ἑκόντας ἢ ἅμα βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντας, εἰ δὲ τὸ βίᾳ ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἑκόντας καὶ ἄκοντας πράττειν· σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ἡμῖν ὡς ἀπαντητέον.
These, then, are the puzzles concerning the incontinent and the continent person about whether both or one of them acts by force, so that they act either not voluntarily or at the same time by force and voluntarily, and if what is by force is involuntary, they act at the same time voluntarily and involuntarily; and it is almost clear to us from what has been said how we must reply.
λέγονται δὲ κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσιν ὃ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἂν μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν.
But they are said in another way to act by force and under necessity, when reason and desire do not disagree, whenever they do what they suppose to be both painful and base, but if they do not do this, there would be blows, bonds, or deaths.
ταῦτα γάρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι.
For they say they did these things under necessity.
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἑκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
Or is it not so, but do they all do this very thing voluntarily?
ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ πάθος.
For it is possible not to do it, but to endure that suffering.
ἔτι ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δʼ οὔ.
Further, perhaps someone would say yes to some of these things and no to others.
ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, ἀεὶ ὅσα πράττει ἃ μὴ βούλεται, ἑκὼν πράττει, καὶ οὐ βίᾳ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βίᾳ πώς, οὐ μέντοι γʼ ἁπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τις διαφορά.
For as many of such things as it is in one's power for them not to exist or to exist, whenever one does what one does not wish, one always acts voluntarily and not by force; but as many of such things as are not in one's power, in a way by force, yet not simply so, because one does not choose this very thing which one does, but that for the sake of which one does it, since there is some difference even in these.
εἰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνοι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη, εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μεῖζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ ποιήσας.
For if, in order not to be touched by feeling, someone should kill, he would be ridiculous if he should say that he acted by force and under necessity; rather, there must be a greater and more painful evil which he will suffer if he does not act.
οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ βίᾳ πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει, ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ταῦτα.
For in this way he will act under necessity and by force, or not by nature, when he does an evil for the sake of a good or for the release from a greater evil, and indeed involuntarily; for these things are not in his power.
διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν, καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.
Therefore, many also class love as involuntary, and some fits of anger, and natural desires, because they are strong and beyond nature; and we have forgiveness for them as being of a nature to force human nature.
καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ ἵνα μὴ ἠρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα χαίρῃ.
And one would seem to act by force and involuntarily rather in order not to suffer severely than in order not to suffer slightly, and in general in order not to suffer rather than in order to rejoice.
τὸ γὰρ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἵα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἵα τε, μήδʼ ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ.
For what is in one's power, to which the whole is reduced, is this: what one's own nature is able to bear; but what it is not able to bear, and what does not belong to that person's natural appetite or reasoning, is not in one's power.
διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας ἔργον ποιοῦντας, ὅμως οὔ φαμεν ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς εἶναι, οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον, οὔτε πρᾶξαι ἃ ἔπραξαν.
Therefore, we do not say that those who are inspired and predict, although they perform a work of thought, are in control of themselves, neither to say what they said nor to do what they did.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαί τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἰσίν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναί τινας λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.
But, indeed, neither is it because of desire; so that some thoughts and passions are not in our power, or actions in accordance with such thoughts and reasonings, but as Philolaus said, there are some reasons stronger than us.