§2.8#1ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν πράττειν, οὐδʼ ἀκούσιον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν, φανερόν· ὅτι δʼ οὐδὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πάλιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
Therefore, it is clear that the voluntary is not acting in accordance with desire, nor is the involuntary acting contrary to desire; and that it is not in accordance with choice either is again obvious from the following.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν ὡς οὐκ ἀκούσιον ἀπεδείχθη, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πᾶν ὃ βούλεται καὶ ἑκούσιον (ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐνδέχεται πράττειν ἑκόντα, τοῦτο δέδεικται μόνον)·
For what is in accordance with wish was shown not to be involuntary, but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary (although it has only been shown that it is possible for one to act voluntarily even without wishing).
πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἐξαίφνης, προαιρεῖται δʼ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίφνης.
But we do many things because we wish to do so suddenly, whereas no one chooses anything suddenly.
εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἦν τριῶν τούτων ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἢ κατʼ ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τούτων δὲ τὰ δύο μὴ ἐστί, λείπεται ἐν τῷ διανοούμενόν πως πράττειν εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον.
But if it was necessary for the voluntary to be some one of these three—either in accordance with desire, or in accordance with choice, or in accordance with thought—and two of these are not it, it remains that the voluntary consists in acting while thinking in some way.
ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον, ἐπιθῶμεν τέλος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου διορισμῷ.
Let us progress the argument a little further and put an end to the definition of the voluntary and the involuntary.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ βίᾳ καὶ μὴ βίᾳ τι ποιεῖν οἰκεῖα τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἶναι·
For doing something by force and not by force seems to be closely related to what has been said.
τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμέν.
For we say that what is forced is involuntary, and everything involuntary is forced.
ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ σκεπτέον πρῶτον, τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον.
So we must first examine about force, what it is and how it stands in relation to the voluntary and the involuntary.
δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων.
Now, in the case of actions, the forced and the necessary, and force and necessity, seem to be opposed to the voluntary and to persuasion.
καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμέν.
In general, we speak of the forced and necessity even in the case of inanimate things; for we say that the stone is carried upward and the fire downward by force and under necessity.
ταῦτα δʼ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει καὶ τὴν καθʼ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βίᾳ, οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ἑκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλʼ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀντίθεσις.
But when these are carried in accordance with their nature and their own impulse, they are not said to be carried by force—nor, indeed, are they said to be voluntary, but the opposition is nameless.
ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βίᾳ φαμέν.
But when they are carried contrary to this, we say it is by force.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶμεν βίᾳ πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινῇ.
Similarly, in the case of animate things and animals, we see them both suffering and doing many things by force, when something from without moves them contrary to the impulse within them.
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἁπλῆ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ.
In inanimate things the principle is simple, but in animate things it is multiple; for desire and reason do not always agree.
ὥστʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἁπλοῦν τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ)· ἐν δʼ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ᾗ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν.
So that in the case of the other animals, the forced is simple, just as in inanimate things (for they do not possess reason and a contrary desire, but live by desire); but in man both are present, and at a certain age, to which we also attribute action.
οὐ γάρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα.
For we do not say that a child acts, nor a beast, but only one who already acts by means of reasoning.
δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βίᾳ μὲν ποιεῖ, χαίρων δέ.
Now, everything forced seems to be painful, and no one acts by force and at the same time rejoicing.
διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστίν.
Therefore, there is the greatest dispute concerning the continent and the incontinent person.
ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὑτῷ πράττει, ὥσθʼ ὅ τʼ ἐγκρατὴς βίᾳ, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὑτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὅ τʼ ἀκρατὴς βίᾳ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
For each of them acts while having impulses contrary to himself, so that the continent person, they say, by force drags himself away from pleasant appetites (for he suffers in dragging himself away against a resisting desire), and the incontinent person by force acts contrary to reasoning.
ἧττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἑκὼν καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς.
But the latter seems to be less pained; for appetite is for the pleasant, which he follows rejoicing, so that the incontinent person acts more voluntarily and not by force, because he does not act painfully.
ἡ δὲ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται.
On the other hand, persuasion is opposed to force and necessity.
ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ἐφʼ ἃ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἑκών.
And the continent person leads toward what he has been persuaded of, and proceeds not by force, but voluntarily.
ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου.
But appetite leads without having persuaded; for it does not participate in reason.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθʼ ὁμοιότητά τινα τοῦ βίᾳ, καθʼ ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται·
Therefore, it has been stated why these people alone seem to act by force and involuntarily, and for what reason—namely, because of a certain similarity to the force of which we speak also in the case of inanimate things.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἴ τις προσθῇ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κἀκεῖ λύεται τὸ λεχθέν.
Nevertheless, if one adds what is attached in the definition, there too what has been said is resolved.
ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινῇ ἢ ἠρεμίζῃ, βίᾳ φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βίᾳ·
For whenever something from without moves or brings to rest contrary to the impulse within, we say it is by force, but when not, not by force.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ ἡ καθʼ αὑτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει)· ὥστʼ οὐ βίᾳ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλʼ ἑκὼν διά γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν, οὐδʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος.
But in the incontinent and the continent person, the internal impulse inherent in them leads (for they possess both); so that neither acts by force, but each would act voluntarily, at least as far as this is concerned, and not under necessity.
τὴν γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσαν ἢ κινοῦσαν, ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτοι τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν·
For we call necessity the external principle which acts contrary to the impulse, either hindering or moving it, just as if someone, having taken hold of another's hand, should strike someone else while that person resists both in wish and in appetite.
ὅταν δʼ ἔσωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, οὐ βίᾳ.
But when the principle is from within, it is not by force.