§2.7ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία ὁρίζεται τούτοις.
Therefore, we must grasp what the voluntary is and what the involuntary is, and what choice is, since virtue and vice are defined by these.
πρῶτον σκεπτέον τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον.
First, we must examine the voluntary and the involuntary.
τριῶν δὴ τούτων ἕν τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ἤτοι κατʼ ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δʼ ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι.
Indeed, [the voluntary] would seem to be some one of these three: either in accordance with desire, or choice, or thought; the voluntary being something in accordance with one of these, and the involuntary being something contrary to one of these.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν.
But desire is divided into three: wish, anger, and appetite; so that we must divide these, and first deal with what is in accordance with appetite.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι.
And all that is in accordance with appetite would seem to be voluntary.
τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος φησί
"
πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμʼ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ. "
ὥστʼ εἴ τι λυπηρόν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν.
For all that is involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced is painful, as is everything that people do or suffer under compulsion, just as Evenus also says: "For every necessary thing is by nature painful." So that if something is painful, it is forced, and if forced, painful.
τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέοσ)̓, ὥστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον.
But everything contrary to appetite is painful (for appetite is for the pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary.
τὸ ἄρα κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτʼ ἀλλήλοις.
Therefore, what is in accordance with appetite is voluntary; for these are contrary to one another.
ἔτι ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δʼ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατʼ αὐτήν, τὸ δʼ ἀδικεῖν ἑκούσιον, ὥσθʼ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀδικήσει τῷ πράττειν κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν·
Moreover, all vice makes a person more unjust, and incontinence seems to be a vice, and the incontinent person is of such a character as to act in accordance with appetite contrary to reasoning, and he is incontinent when he acts in accordance with it, and doing injustice is voluntary.
ἑκὼν ἄρα πράξει, καὶ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ δικαιότεροι ἔσονται οἱ ἀκρατεῖς γινόμενοι. —ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοὐναντίον.
So that the incontinent person will do injustice by acting in accordance with appetite; therefore he will act voluntarily, and what is in accordance with appetite is voluntary; for indeed it would be absurd if people became more just by becoming incontinent. — Now, from these arguments, what is in accordance with appetite would seem to be voluntary, but from the following, the contrary.
ἅπαν γὰρ ὃ ἑκών τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὃ βούλεται, ἑκών.
For everything that one does voluntarily, one does wishing it, and what one wishes, one does voluntarily.
βούλεται δʼ οὐθεὶς ὃ οἴεται εἶναι κακόν.
But no one wishes what he thinks to be bad.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρʼ ὃ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν.
Yet the incontinent person does not do what he wishes; for to be incontinent is to act because of appetite contrary to what one thinks to be best.
ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον.
So that it will result that the same person acts voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time; but this is impossible.
ἔτι δʼ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας.
Moreover, the continent person will act justly, and more so than in incontinence.
ἡ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ.
For continence is a virtue, and virtue makes people more just.
ἐγκρατεύεται δʼ ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
And one is continent when he acts contrary to appetite in accordance with reasoning.
ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἑκούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἑκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ θάτερον ἑκούσιον, καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἑκὼν καὶ ἄκων.
So that if acting justly is voluntary, just as doing injustice is (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and it is necessary, if the one is voluntary, that the other is also), and what is contrary to appetite is involuntary, then the same person will do the same thing voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας·
And the same argument applies also to anger.
καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρόν, καὶ βίαιον ἡ κάθεξις, ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη πᾶν.
For incontinence and continence seem to exist with respect to anger as well, just as to appetite; and what is contrary to anger is painful, and the holding back is forced, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with anger would all be voluntary.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· "χαλεπὸν γάρ" φησι "θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται. "εἰ δʼ ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸν ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος, μᾶλλον ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν.
And Heraclitus also seems to speak, looking to the strength of anger, that the hindrance of it is painful; for he says: "It is hard to fight against anger, for it buys with the soul." But if it is impossible for the same person to act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time in respect of the same part of the action, what is in accordance with wish is more voluntary than what is in accordance with appetite and anger.
τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἑκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
And a proof of this is: for we do many things voluntarily without anger and appetite.
λείπεται ἄρα, εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἑκούσιον ταὐτό, σκέψασθαι.
It remains, then, to examine whether what is in accordance with wish and the voluntary are the same.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.
But this also seems impossible.
ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται· συμβήσεται δὲ τοὐναντίον.
For it is assumed by us and seems to be that vice makes people more unjust, and incontinence appears to be a kind of vice; but the contrary will result.
βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἴεται εἶναι κακά, πράττει δʼ ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής·
For no one wishes what he thinks to be bad, but he does it when he becomes incontinent.
εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἑκούσιον, τὸ δʼ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατὴς γένηται, οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλʼ ἔσται δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατής.
If, then, doing injustice is voluntary, and the voluntary is what is in accordance with wish, when he becomes incontinent, he will no longer do injustice, but will be more just than before he became incontinent.
τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον.
But this is impossible.