§2.6λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐπιούσης σκέψεως.
Let us then take another starting point for the ensuing inquiry.
εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἑκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ὂν ὅλως ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά.
Indeed, all substances are by nature certain starting points, wherefore each is able to generate many such things, as for example a human generates humans, and an animal in general animals, and a plant plants.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅ γʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεών τινών ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν.
And in addition to these, man at least is a starting point of certain actions, alone among animals; for of the others we would say none acts.
τῶν δʼ ἀρχῶν ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως ἀφʼ ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἣν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἄρχει.
And of the starting points that are of such a kind, from which movements first arise, they are called authoritative, and most justly those from which things cannot be otherwise, which starting point perhaps God rules.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί γε καθʼ ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστʼ ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δʼ αὑτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ διʼ ἐκείνης δεῖξαι.
But in immovable starting points, such as in mathematics, there is no authoritative element, although it is indeed spoken of by analogy; for here too, if the starting point is changed, all the demonstrated things would especially change, yet they do not change of themselves through the destruction of one by another, unless by destroying the hypothesis and demonstrating through it.
ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός· ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις.
And man is a starting point of a certain movement; for action is a movement.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν διʼ αὐτὴν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων.
And since, as in other cases, the starting point is the cause of the things that exist or come to be because of it, one must conceive this just as in the case of demonstrations.
εἰ γὰρ ἔχοντος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας ὀρθάς, φανερὸν ὡς αἴτιον τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον.
For if, because the triangle has two right angles, it is necessary for the quadrangle to have four right angles, it is manifest that the cause of this is the triangle's having two right angles.
εἰ δέ γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὀκτώ.
And if the triangle changes, it is necessary for the quadrangle also to change, for example if three, to six, and if four, to eight.
κἂν εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλοι, τοιοῦτον δʼ ἐστί, κακεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.
And even if it should not change, but is of such a character, it is necessary for that other also to be of such a character.
δῆλον δʼ ὃ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δʼ οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε, πλὴν τοσοῦτον.
And that what we are attempting to say is necessary, is clear from the 'Analytics'; but now we can neither omit to speak of it nor speak of it with precision, except for this much.
εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχή τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὕστερον.
For if there is no other cause of the triangle's being thus, this would be a kind of starting point and the cause of what follows.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας.
So that if indeed some of the things that exist are capable of being otherwise, it is necessary that their starting points also are of such a kind.
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐστί, τὰ δέ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τἀναντία, καὶ ὃ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί.
For from things of necessity the consequence is necessary, but from these starting points contraries can come to be, and what is up to humans themselves constitutes many of such things, and they themselves are the starting points of such things.
ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, καὶ ὅτι ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ταῦτʼ ἐστι γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.
So that of whatever actions man is the starting point and master, it is clear that they are capable both of happening and of not happening, and that it is up to him for these to happen or not, of those things at least of whose being and non-being he is master.
ὅσα δʼ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ἐστι ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος τούτων αὐτὸς ἐστίν· καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφʼ αὑτῷ.
And of all things that it is up to him to do or not to do, he himself is the cause; and of whatever things he is the cause, they are up to him.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλʼ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστιν ὧν αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων.
And since both virtue and vice and the works arising from them are partly praiseworthy and partly blameworthy (for people are blamed and praised not because of things that belong to them by necessity or fortune or nature, but because of all things of which they themselves are the causes; for of whatever things another is the cause, that person also bears the blame and praise), it is clear that both virtue and vice are about those things of which he himself is the cause and starting point of actions.
ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων.
We must grasp, then, of what kind of actions he himself is the cause and starting point.
πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἑκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δʼ ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον.
Now we all agree that, as for all things that are voluntary and in accordance with each one's choice, that person is the cause, but as for things involuntary, he himself is not the cause.
πάντα δʼ ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἑκὼν δῆλον ὅτι.
And all things that he does by choosing, it is clear that he also does voluntarily.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἑκουσίων ἂν εἴησαν.
It is clear, therefore, that both virtue and vice would belong to voluntary things.