§2.4εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διῄρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δʼ ὄρεξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρεξιν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῦλον τὸ ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας.
These things having been grasped, after this it must be said that since there are two parts of the soul, and the virtues are divided according to these, and some are intellectual virtues belonging to the part having reason, whose work is truth, either about how things are or about generation, and others belong to the irrational part, which however has desire (for not just any part of the soul has desire, if indeed it is divisible), it is necessary indeed that character is bad and good by pursuing and avoiding certain pleasures and pains.
δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις.
And this is clear from the divisions concerning passions and capacities and states.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ διώρισται· ὥστε διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας.
For the capacities and states belong to the passions, and the passions are defined by pain and pleasure; so that through these and through the previous assumptions it happens that all moral virtue is about pleasures and pains.
πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ὑφʼ οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή.
For every soul is in relation to and about those things by which it is naturally made worse and better, and pleasure is about these.
διʼ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ.
And we say that people are bad because of pleasures and pains, by pursuing and avoiding either as they ought not or those which they ought not.
διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἠρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.
Therefore all define virtues readily as apathy and tranquility about pleasures and pains, and vices from the contraries.
§2.5ἐπεὶ δʼ ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀφʼ ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθʼ ἣν ἄριστα διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθʼ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσʼ ἄττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.
And since it is assumed that virtue is such a state from which people are performative of the best things and according to which they are best disposed towards the best, and the best and excellent is that according to right reason, and this is the mean of excess and deficiency in relation to us; it would be necessary that moral virtue is itself each a mediocrity and is about certain means in pleasures and pains and pleasant and painful things.
ἔσται δʼ ἡ μεσότης ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις), ὁτὲ δʼ ἐν λύπαις, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις.
And the mediocrity will be sometimes in pleasures (for there is excess and deficiency), sometimes in pains, and sometimes in both.
ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ πρός τινα ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δʼ ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.
For he who exceeds in rejoicing exceeds in the pleasant, and he who exceeds in being pained in the contrary, and these things either simply or in relation to some limit, as for example when not as the many do; but the good man as he ought.
—ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστί τις ἕξις ἀφʼ ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ὃ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὃ δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτʼ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.
And since there is some state from which he who has it will be such that, of the same thing, one accepts the excess and another the deficiency, it is necessary, as these are contrary to one another and to the mean, so also the states are contrary to one another and to virtue.
συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἔνθα μὲν φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἔνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν.
However, it happens that the oppositions are in some cases all more manifest, in others those towards excess, and in some places those towards deficiency.
αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ὅτι οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλʼ ὁτὲ μὲν θᾶττον ἂν μεταβαίη ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν, ὁτὲ δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἧς ὃς πλέον ἀπέχει, οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἐλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἡ ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολῆς.
And the cause of the contrariety is that the inequality or similarity towards the mean is not always in the same direction, but sometimes one would change more quickly from excess to the mean state, and sometimes from deficiency, and the one who is further removed from it seems to be more contrary; as for example also concerning the body, in labors excess is healthier than deficiency and closer to the mean, but in food deficiency is healthier than excess.
ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἕξεις αἱ φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλοϋγιεῖς μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθʼ ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι, ἔνθα δʼ αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός.
So that also the choice-states that are fond of gymnastics and fond of health will be more so in accordance with each choice, in one case those with more labor, in another those with more restriction, and the one contrary to the moderate and to that which is according to reason is in one case the laborless and not both, and in another the indulgent and not the hungry.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο, διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλʼ ἧττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀπολαυστικοί.
And this happens because nature from the start is not similarly distant from the mean in all things, but we are less fond of labor and more indulgent.
ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς.
And these things hold similarly concerning the soul.
ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἕξιν ἐφʼ ἥν τε ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφʼ ἣν οἱ πολλοί (ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὖσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πραότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράῳ.
And we set as contrary the state towards which we err more and towards which the many do (while the other, as if not existing, escapes notice; for because of being rare it is unperceived), as for example we set anger contrary to gentleness and the irascible to the gentle.
καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἵλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον.
And yet there is excess also in being mild and conciliatory and not being angry when being struck.
ἀλλʼ ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.
But such people are few, and all lean more towards the former.
διὸ καὶ οὐ κολακικὸν ὁ θυμός.
Therefore also anger is not a flattering thing.
ἐπεὶ δʼ εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθʼ ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων, καθʼ ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δʼ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσί, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται.
And since the classification of states has been grasped in accordance with each passion, and the excesses and deficiencies, and of the contrary states, in accordance with which they have them according to right reason (and what is right reason, and towards what limit one must look in speaking of the mean, must be examined later), it is clear that all moral virtues and vices are about excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, and pleasures and pains arise from the mentioned states and passions.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε βελτίστη ἕξις ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα μέση ἐστίν.
But indeed the best state is the mean about each.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.
It is clear, therefore, that the virtues will be either all or some of these mediocrities.