§2.3διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἰατρικῇ, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν πράξει, καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ.
These things having been defined, we must grasp that in every continuous and divisible thing there is excess, deficiency, and a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us, as for example in gymnastics, in medicine, in building, in navigation, and in any action whatsoever, both scientific and unscientific, and technical and non-technical.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις.
For movement is continuous, and action is movement.
ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.
And in all things the mean in relation to us is best; for this is as science commands and as reason commands.
πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν.
And everywhere this also produces the best state.
καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου.
And this is clear through induction and reason.
τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἄλληλα· τὰ δʼ ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία.
For contraries destroy each other; and the extremes are contrary both to each other and to the mean.
τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μεῖζον, τοῦ μείζονος δὲ ἔλαττον.
For the mean is either in relation to either, as for example the equal is greater than the smaller, and smaller than the greater.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσʼ ἄττα εἶναι καὶ μεσότητα τινά.
So that it is necessary that moral virtue is about certain means and is a certain mediocrity.
ληπτέον ἄρα ἡ ποία μεσότης ἀρετή, καὶ περὶ ποῖα μέσα.
We must therefore grasp what sort of mediocrity virtue is, and about what sort of means.
εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.
Let it then be taken by way of example, and let each be observed from the outline.
ὀργιλότης ἀναλγησία πραότης.
Irascibility, insensibility, gentleness.
θρασύτης δειλία ἀνδρεία.
Rashness, cowardice, courage.
ἀναισχυντία κατάπληξις αἰδώς.
Shamelessness, bashfulness, modesty.
ἀκολασία ἀναισθησία σωφροσύνη.
Intemperance, insensibility, temperance.
φθόνος ἀνώνυμον νέμεσις.
Envy, unnamed, righteous indignation.
κέρδος ζημία δίκαιον.
Gain, loss, justice.
ἀσωτία ἀνελευθερία ἐλευθεριότης.
Prodigality, illiberality, liberality.
ἀλαζονεία εἰρωνεία ἀλήθεια.
Boastfulness, irony, truthfulness.
κολακεία ἀπέχθεια φιλία.
Flattery, surliness, friendliness.
ἀρέσκεια αὐθάδεια σεμνότης.
Complaisance, self-will, dignity.
κακοπάθεια χαυνότης μικροψυχία μεγαλοψυχία.
Malice, vanity, smallness of soul, greatness of soul.
δαπανηρία μικροπρέπεια μεγαλοπρέπεια.
Extravagance, paltriness, magnificence.
εὐήθεια.
Foolishness,...
τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν.
These passions and such things happen to the souls, and all of them are spoken of, some by exceeding, and others by falling short.
ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θᾶττον καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ, ἀνάλγητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς·
For the irascible man is he who gets angry more than he ought, and more quickly, and with more people than he ought; and the insensible man is he who falls short in respect of whom, and when, and how.
καὶ θρασὺς μὲν ὁ μήτε ἃ χρὴ φοβούμενος μήθʼ ὅτε μήθʼ ὥς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὅτʼ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ·
And the rash man is he who neither fears what he ought, nor when, nor how; and the coward is he who fears both what he ought not, and when he ought not, and how he ought not.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μηδʼ ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἀπαθὴς ὥσπερ λίθος·
Likewise also the intemperate and the desirous man, and he who exceeds in all things in which it is possible; and the insensible man is he who falls short and does not even desire as much as is better and according to nature, but is unaffected like a stone.
κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικός, ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλʼ ὀλιγαχόθεν·
And the greedy man is he who is avaricious from everywhere; and the losing man is he who is from nowhere, but from few places.
ἀλαζὼν δὲ ὁ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω·
And the boaster is he who pretends to more than what belongs to him; and the ironical man is he who pretends to less.
καὶ κόλαξ μὲν ὁ πλείω συνεπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω·
And the flatterer is he who commends more than is proper; and the surly man is he who commends less.
καὶ τὸ μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δʼ ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις εὐθάδεια·
And that which is too much in relation to pleasure is complaisance; and that which is little and with difficulty is self-will.
χαῦνος δʼ ὁ μειζόνων ἀξιῶν αὑτόν, μικρόψυχος δʼ ὁ ἐλαττόνων·
And the vain man is he who deems himself worthy of greater things; and the small-souled man of smaller things.
ἔτι δʼ ἄσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων·
Further, the prodigal is he who exceeds in respect of all expenditure; and the illiberal is he who falls short in respect of all.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος·
Likewise also the magnificent and the paltry; for the former exceeds what is fitting, and the latter falls short of what is fitting.
φθονερὸς δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες), ὁ δʼ ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, ἔστι δʼ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μηδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν, ἀλλʼ εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὃ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.
Also the envious man is characterized by being pained at more prosperities than he ought (for those who are worthy of prospering pain the envious when they prosper), and the contrary is more nameless, but he is the one who exceeds by not being pained even at those who prosper undeservedly, but is easy-going like gluttons towards food, while the other is hard to please in accordance with envy.
— τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζειν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε ποιητική, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστι πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς.
But to define that in relation to each thing it is not by accident to be in this state is superfluous; for no science, whether theoretical or productive, either speaks or acts by further defining this, but this belongs to the logical sophistries of the arts.
ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δʼ, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἕξεων λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.
Simply, then, let it be defined in this manner, and more accurately when we speak of the opposite states.
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἴδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνου ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρός τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη.
And of these passions themselves, species are named by differing in accordance with the excess either of time, or of the degree, or in relation to some of those which produce the passions.
λέγω δʼ οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὲν τῷ θᾶττον πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.
And I mean, for example, the quick-tempered man by being affected more quickly than he ought, and the harsh and passionate man by being more so, and the bitter man by being preservative of anger, and the striker and abusive man by the punishments resulting from anger.
ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι καὶ οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὁποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.
And gourmands, gluttons, and wine-bibbers are named by having the capacity of being affected contrary to reason in respect of the enjoyment of either kind of food.
οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον πάσχειν.
But we must not be ignorant that some of those things spoken of are not in the "how one takes it", if it is taken in some way by being affected more.
οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτὴ δὴ ἐστίν.
For example, the adulterer is not so by approaching wives more than he ought (for there is no such thing), but this is itself a certain wickedness.
συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι.
For both the passion and its being of such a kind are spoken of in combination.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις.
And likewise also outrage.
διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ μοιχεῦσαι· ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι καὶ πατάξαι μέν, ἀλλʼ οὐχʼ ὑβρίσαι·
Therefore they also dispute, claiming that they had intercourse, but did not commit adultery; for they did it in ignorance or under compulsion; and that they struck, but did not commit outrage.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
And likewise also in the case of other such things.