§2.10#3ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκα τινός, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις ἀεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς διʼ ἀκριβείασ)̓, περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις.
Since, however, the one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of something, and there is always some goal for the one who deliberates, towards which he considers what is advantageous, about the end itself no one deliberates, but this is a starting-point and a hypothesis, just as hypotheses are in the theoretical sciences (and concerning these, it has been spoken briefly in the beginning, and with precision in the Analytics), but the inquiry concerning the things leading to the end is, both with art and without art, common to all, as for instance, to those who are deliberating whether to wage war or not to wage war.
ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ διʼ ὅ, τοῦτʼ ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἕνεκα.
And from what is prior there will rather be 'that through which', this is 'that for the sake of which', as for instance wealth or pleasure or any other such thing which happens to be 'that for the sake of which'.
βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἔσκεπται, ἢ ὅ τι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὑτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
For the one who deliberates, if he has examined starting from the end, deliberates either on what contributes to that end so that he may bring it back to himself, or on what he himself is able to do towards the end.
τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιτο ἂν εἰ δῴη φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσηται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς ἄριστον ἐστίν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.
And the end is by nature always good, and about which they deliberate in particular cases, as for instance, a doctor might deliberate whether he should give medicine, and a general where he should pitch camp, for whom the good is the end which is simply the best; but contrary to nature and perversion, it is not the good, but the apparent good.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ χρήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τʼ ἰδεῖν οὗ μή ἐστιν ὄψις, οὐδʼ ἀκοῦσαι οὗ μή ἐστιν ἀκοή· ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη.
And the cause is that, of existing things, some are not possible to use for anything other than what they are by nature suited for, as for instance sight; for it is not possible to see with that of which there is no sight, nor to hear with that of which there is no hearing; but from knowledge it is possible to produce also that of which there is no knowledge.
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.
For the same knowledge is not of health and of disease in the same way, but of the former according to nature, and of the latter contrary to nature.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστί, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.
And similarly, wish also by nature is of the good, but contrary to nature it is also of the bad, and it wishes by nature indeed the good, but contrary to nature and perversion also the bad.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ.
But indeed, the destruction and perversion of each thing is not into any chance thing, but into the opposites and the intermediates.
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν.
For it is not possible to step outside of these, since error also does not occur towards any chance things, but towards the opposites in all those things for which there are opposites, and towards those of the opposites which are opposites according to knowledge.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον). —αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἥδιον ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον.
Therefore it is necessary that both error and choice occur from the mean towards the opposites (and the opposites to the mean are the excess and the defect). —And the cause is the pleasant and the painful; for it is so circumstanced that to the soul the pleasant appears good and the more pleasant better, and the painful bad and the more painful worse.
ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία.
So that from these things too it is clear that virtue and vice are about pleasures and pains.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.
For they happen to be about the objects of choice, and choice is about the good and the bad and the apparent, and pleasure and pain are by nature of this sort.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ αὐτή τε μεσότης τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, καθʼ ὅσα ποῖός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος· ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκυς ἢ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος.
It is necessary then, since moral virtue is itself a certain mean and is entirely about pleasures and pains, and vice is in excess and defect and about the same things as virtue, that moral virtue is a state of choosing the mean relative to us in pleasant and painful things, in respect of all those things in which one is said to have a certain character of character, either by enjoying or by grieving; for the lover of sweet or lover of bitter is not said to have a certain character of character.